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METHOD LAWYERING1 
IMMERSION TEACHING ILLUSTRATED 
 
Kris Franklin* 
 
Scenario: Frankie and Saanvi are a lesbian couple who 
have been together for almost two decades. They met in 
college and are now in their mid-thirties. They had never 
really thought about getting married, but in the wake of 
legal and political changes in the U.S., as well as changes 
in their employment and financial status, changing 
community mores around legalized same sex marriage, and 
discussions of the possibility of having and legally 
protecting children, they are beginning to explore the 
option. Both partners work in creative fields. In recent 
years Saanvi’s work has been especially well-received. 
Much to both partners’ surprise, Saanvi has been 
generating substantial income over the last few years and 
has become unexpectedly wealthy. 
Through the vantage point of a lesbian couple 
ambivalent about the institution of marriage, this scenario 
traces most of the central legal questions surrounding 
marriage and divorce, conceiving and raising children, 
owning property within married relationships, and 
preparing for and resolving dissolution of a marital union. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Teaching Law by Immersion 
Informed by the adage “show, don’t tell,” this Article seeks to provide an 
immersive introduction to immersive teaching and learning in law school.  
                                                 
1 “Method Lawyering” is both a reversal of the Lawyering Method elements used as a 
framing device throughout this work, and an allusion to method actors’ efforts to immerse 
themselves in the totality of their characters to gain a deeper understanding of their 
circumstances. Method actors believe that there is no other way to gain such a rich sense of 
their characters’ contexts then to understand and identify with their lives to the greatest extent 
achievable. The immersion teaching discussed here similarly seeks expanded comprehension 
through experience. 
* Professor of Law and Director of Academic Initiatives, New York Law School. Much 
appreciation to the many colleagues who have provided comments on early drafts of this 
article, including participants in the NY Family Law Scholars Workshop and the NYLS 
Faculty Colloquium. 
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Professor Peggy Cooper Davis,2 together with her collaborator Danielle 
Davenport,3 initially wrote the above-sketched scenario as a portion of the 
Family Practice4 course they taught together at NYU School of Law (now 
with Brence Pernell5). The scenarios were subsequently adapted for a 2018 
Harvard Law School seminar Professional Responsibility in Family Practice 
taught by Professor Davis,6 and then again reshaped for use in a simulation-
based family law survey entitled Family Law in Practice that I teach at New 
York Law School.7 These various courses differ significantly in purpose and 
pitch, though all are centered on student-lawyers working through the same 
principal narratives.8 In addition to sharing the central stories and characters, 
this array of quite disparate courses uses a common instructional model that 
we9 call the Immersion Method.10  
                                                 
2 John S.R. Shad Professor of Lawyering and Ethics & Director, Experiential Learning 
Lab, NYU School of Law. 
3 Actor, playwright, and Teaching Fellow, NYU School of Law Experiential Learning 
Lab. 
4 See https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29420. 
5 Assistant General Counsel, MRDC and Adjunct Professor, NYU School of Law. 
6 See https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29421. 
7 See https://www.nyls.edu/academics/j_d_course_of_study/curriculum/course-
detail/?course=4935. 
8 The Frankie/Saanvi scenario makes up the bulk of the courses discussed here, but all 
also include a second scenario that introduces the child protection system and explores both 
parental/familial autonomy and the oversight of the state. That scenario deepens students 
understanding of tensions pertaining to liberty and order in the family law context, and raises 
important considerations of race, class and education in family courts.  
9 Pronoun references in this work are a little complicated. I owe a great debt to Davis 
and Davenport as the primary creators of the characters these courses are centered around, 
and to Davis as the originator of the instructional design all these courses utilize. I contributed 
to the revision work that Davis and Davenport undertook to emphasize professional 
responsibility issues for the Harvard version, and have intermittently continued to consult in 
the ongoing partnership between Davis and Pernell. Simultaneously, with permission I 
adapted the narratives to fit the needs and design of my own class. Thus, much of the work 
and conversation around these courses has felt intensely collaborative. I therefore use “we” 
in this article to refer to the fruitful intersections of this alliance. I use “I” when referring 
solely to my own particular class. 
10 As designated by Prof. Davis in a separate collaboration that included Davis, Susan 
L. Brooks (Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law), Susan S. Kuo (South 
Carolina School of Law) and me.  
We want to be careful not to suggest, however, that we believe this kind of law teaching 
is unprecedented. Others before us have built courses with educational goals growing out of 
simulated client work. In fact Susan B. Apel, has already successfully done so in the same 
field of family law. See Susan B. Apel, No More Casebooks: Using Simulation-Based 
Learning to Educate Future Family Law Practitioners, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 700 (2011) 
(hearinafter No More Casebooks). Relatedly, see Andrew Schepard & Herbie DiFonzo, 
Hofstra’s Family Law With Skills Course: Implementing FLER (The Family Law Education 
Reform Project), 49 FAM. CT. REV. 685 (2011). Regrettably, we were not aware of these 
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The immersion method integrates doctrinal, practical and values training 
in legal education by drawing freely from the most sophisticated techniques 
of case method, simulation, and clinical teaching. Though some class 
meetings look and feel like traditional case-driven law classes, the instruction 
and learning in immersion courses—particularly of foundational legal 
doctrine—is driven entirely by the simulated client work.11  
Frequently in our immersion classes students are given some background 
cases and statutes to start from. They are also sometimes given more directed 
questions to consider while other students are working on different issues. 
From these beginning points the student-lawyers must then formulate their 
own research inquiries, acquaint themselves with the law in question, and 
prepare to engage in the next lawyering task required by the case.12 
Instructors devote considerable time in class meetings to helping students 
unpack client narratives, identify legal issues, and plan their research and 
client work. But in the immersion classroom there is often a collaborative feel 
of the professor guiding what is ultimately a student-led discussion rather 
than simply assigning work or interrogating students’ comprehension.  
The lawyering tasks the students undertake in the course include 
preparing case memos, briefing supervising attorneys, interviewing experts, 
counseling clients, preparing documents for the client, and advocating or 
negotiating on the client’s behalf. With faculty guidance and expert 
supervision, students teach themselves the basics of family law doctrine13 
                                                 
prior works when we constructed our own family law immersion courses. It would have 
undoubtedly enriched our work had we been. Yet there remains some benefit to having 
arrived independently at similar objectives, and our goals are perhaps more global and less 
directly preparatory for practice than theirs. 
11 This coverage of legal rules in direct response to the requirements of well-chosen 
simulations is what distinguishes immersive learning from the exercises many colleagues 
add to their doctrinal instruction in casebook courses. Such simulations are frequently 
wonderful opportunities for students to apply legal rules and consolidate their mastery of key 
concepts, and I use these kinds of projects in many of my own courses. Yet I distinguish 
them from fully immersive learning if they are designed to reinforce or supplement what is 
conceived of as the core learning in a course. 
12 This Article’s goal is to give readers some of the feel of what these classes do. A very 
different type of writing would be required to detail all of the logistics of the course. It 
therefore skims over important considerations such when we use actors in role as clients 
(some, but deliberately as infrequently as possible to make the course economically feasible 
and reproducible), how the course is scheduled (for mine, just like any other doctrinal class 
that meets twice a week in an ordinary classroom), how we conduct in-role work in class 
with a manageable number of students rather than the whole class, or how as faculty we 
move back and forth between more professorial roles to acting in more supervisory capacities 
to guide/coach students through the simulations. Any of us who teach these classes would be 
happy to provide syllabi, materials, or consultation to other faculty who would be interested 
in exploring this kind of teaching for their own courses. 
13 We do ensure students learn the basic rules of family law they will need for practice 
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while simultaneously practicing and critically examining lawyering 
interactions, and honing their research, writing and legal drafting skills. In 
my particular course roughly half of the class sessions are conducted entirely 
in-role working on parts of the simulation. The remaining class sessions are 
conducted as out-of-role workshops where the students and I work together 
to ensure that they understand the law and the facts, have located the primary 
sources they need, and that they understand them and are using them 
effectively.14 
As faculty, then, we get to lead the same kinds of careful examinations of 
rules of law that more traditional Socratic classrooms generate, just done 
through the lens of a specific client’s problems. Meanwhile our students learn 
legal doctrine in ways that are likely to foster retention;15 reinforce basic law 
school skills of case reading, statutory analysis, and application of rules to 
facts, all while developing additional skills they will need in the profession.16 
Immersion teaching helps fulfill the ABA mandate that law graduates 
complete at least six credits of experiential coursework.17  
                                                 
and the bar exam. In my class this is tested by a take-home examination in which students 
are expected to apply the rules they have learned to new facts which differ substantially from 
those raised in the course simulations. This shows students (and my administration!) that 
even in this new format they have covered what they would be expected to learn in a more 
traditional family law course. 
14 Others have pointed out that some of what this article describes and proposes may be 
less of a radical (read: easier) shift for me than for some legal educators. I have perhaps an 
unusually intersectional law teaching background. I began my career as a practitioner 
handling individual cases, and I have substantial experience teaching a variety of traditional 
doctrinal courses, along with simulation-based lawyering skills courses, legal writing and 
research, all overlaid with a background in learning theory and academic enhancement. All 
of these are at least somewhat relevant to undertaking the kind of immersion teaching this 
article describes. But while that degree of variety in teaching assignments may not be 
common, law professors bringing a diverse array of personal and professional expertise to 
their classes is hardly unusual. I firmly believe that skilled law faculty who wanted to 
undertake this kind of teaching could so do well no matter what their previous professional 
path.  
15 Nellie Munin & Yael Efron, Role-Playing Brings Theory to Life in a Multicultural 
Learning Environment, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 309, 313 (2017); see also Nadja Alexander & 
Michelle LeBaron, Death of the Role-Play, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 459, 466 (2010) 
(in-role work “is said to yield deeper and broader learning”). Empirical support for the 
common assertion that experiential learning promotes retention has been especially well 
documented in medical training. See for example Rahul R. Bogam, Effect of Simulation 
Based Education on Knowledge of Medical Students in Context of Community Medicine, 3 
INT’L J. MED. RES. & HEALTH SCI., 651 (2014). 
16 That this is true both for family law specialist skills (i.e. drafting prenuptial 
agreements), and for more general practice readiness (i.e. writing client advice letters or 
negotiation). 
17 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 
STANDARDS 301(b), 302 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2014-15). 
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We love teaching immersion classes. They provide some of the structure 
of traditional law teaching while pushing the boundaries of learning from 
work that feels real and has a practical and personal dimension. There is 
simply something different, deeper, and more magically enriched about 
learning that arises from invested personal experience. 
 
An Article Modeling Immersion Methodology 
Rather than arguing It is framed in vignettes that illustrate parts of a 
specific client problem, then move out toward thinking through (some of)18 
what would be needed to address that problem, and then proceed more 
abstractly toward using that experience to examine (some of)19 the processes 
both student-lawyers and faculty-supervisors have engaged in.20  
Each of the first four sections of this Article shows a portion of what 
students do in the corresponding segment of the course. These sections then 
come from a different angle to surface some of the considerations that went 
into building and teaching that segment. I hope this structure provides an 
intriguing dialogue between the student-lawyers’ processes and the faculty 
processes that went into engineering those student experiences. The Article 
then wraps up in Part V with a consideration of ways the immersion method 
merges clinical methodology the essentially doctrinal/Langdellian purpose of 
most law school lecture courses. 
With such ambitiously layered objectives it may be helpful to have some 
sort of grounding armature to structure this examination/modeling of the 
immersion family law course. Many related-but-differing descriptions of the 
components of experiential learning exist, and in this Article I am choosing 
(not entirely arbitrarily) to rely on one version that shares a common DNA 
with the genesis of this family law course: the Elements of the Lawyering 
Method as developed and refined by the NYU Lawyering Program.21 The 
                                                 
18 All legal work is incredibly multi-faceted, and the dynamics of interpersonal 
interaction and intrapersonal awareness add additional layers to lawyers’ professional work. 
Thus the topics in any one of the snippets included here could easily fill volumes. I am critical 
of the limitations of my own judgments about what to draw attention to, but then this Article 
is intended to be illustrative rather than all-inclusive. 
19 Id. 
20 As, inevitably, do all client/problem-based teaching methodologies. See Wyatt G. 
Sassman, Cases as Fictions: Clinical Methods in Teaching and Scholarship, 4 SAVANNAH 
L. REV. 95, 107 (2017) (describing clinical methods for teaching legal doctrine as “analysis 
[that] starts with the client’s goals and moves outward to what legal tools are available in the 
doctrine. The availability of a specific legal tool is dependent on the presence of both the 
fictional client’s need and the necessary contextual facts.”) 
21 Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29418 [hereinafter Experiential Learning 
Lab]. The Lawyering Method builds on the multiple intelligence work of researchers such as 
Howard Gardner. It presupposes that excellence in law practice requires a range of 
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Article is structured with the four Lawyering Method elements as a sort of 
exoskeleton: Setting Goals; Interpreting Facts; Interpreting Rules; and 
Managing Interactions.22  
Thus each of the first four sections of the Article begins by envisioning a 
slice of what students are working on for the client problem. For each 
Lawyering Element the piece then moves in two parts: 
1. First, I use the Lawyering Element comparatively literally. That is, to 
consider what this particular class segment requires the student-
lawyers to do, and through that work, what students learn about that 
element. For each illustrative vignette, this section seeks to elucidate 
and deconstruct what the students are doing/learning through their 
work. 
2. Next, in light of each vignette, I use the Lawyering Element more 
conceptually (and to be honest, far more loosely) as a vantage point for 
small portions of faculty reflection about the student learning 
experience.  
To summarize, I ask in turn: What are Goals for this class, and also 
overall goals for educating lawyers? What do the Facts tell us about 
what we believe developing lawyers must learn, the current realities of 
legal pedagogy, and the limitations of time and built-in incentives in 
law teaching? What are the core Rules of family law, and of the 
social/cultural constructions of family that students encountering the 
subject must come away comprehending? Also, what are the internal 
and external rules that govern current legal pedagogy, what policies 
and assumptions underlie them, and ideally how should they affect our 
pedagogy going forward? And finally, what are the nuts and bolts of 
how we Manage Interactions among clients, colleagues, and 
students, for courses like these? What are the logistics of who does 
what in the course? And in a world of limited resources and debates 
                                                 
intellectual, interpersonal and emotional skills. Refinements in defining the Lawyering 
Method were developed as a collective effort combining the thinking leading scholars across 
an array of disciplines including Anthony G. Amsterdam (law), Jerome Bruner (psychology), 
and Carol Gilligan (psychology), as well as dozens of thoughtful participants in the NYU 
Lawyering Theory Colloquium and the NYU Lawyering Program Workways pedagogy 
working group. 
22 I adopt this particular framework because it is uncomplicated, well-considered, and 
comparatively indisputable. But its ease can also be misleading: many of these elements 
bleed into one another far more than this list implies. That can be seen throughout this Article, 
where part of what I consider as “facts” might also be examined through the lens of “goals,” 
and so forth. But however imperfect or loosely-metaphorical a structure it provides, having 
some form of external organization principle is far more useful than having none. 
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about directions for legal education more generally, what are the 
ramifications for more widespread use of immersive methodologies?  
 
I.  SETTING GOALS  
Student A: So, here’s one issue we all seem to be agreed 
upon: we’re going to recommend that we represent only 
Frankie, not Frankie and Saanvi together. Even if it’s 
technically ethical, it seems like there’s too much potential 
for conflict of interest, especially with what we know about 
their different finances. 
Student B: That makes sense. 
Student C: Yeah, I agree. 
Student A: So if that’s the case, we still need to clarify 
what we know and maybe do research to find out more 
about what we want to advise Frankie to do in terms of her 
relationship with Saanvi. 
Student B: But how much research do we really want to 
bill Frankie for if it’s simplest and safest for them just to get 
married? My bet is that that’s what they’ll end up doing 
anyway.  
Student C: Fair enough, but we know that Frankie is 
still pretty ambivalent about getting married. Shouldn’t we 
at least find out more about the kinds of documents they’d 
need to get close to the protections they would have from 
marriage? At the same time, we also know that it’s more 
expensive and time-consuming and might not provide the 
same protections in the long run… 
Student A (interrupting): Does anyone know what those 
documents are or how close they get you? I know I don’t, 
and we are going to have to spend some time looking into 
it. 
Student B: My sense is that that’s Frankie’s decision, 
not ours. Let’s present her with the various options and see 
which one she goes for. 
Student A: And there’s the added complication if they 
do end up having children, which she has mentioned to us 
more than once. We have to present Frankie with two 
scenarios here. One with kids and the other without. 
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Student C: So really one decision leads to the next 
decision leads to the next. We are going to have to help walk 
her through all of them, kind of like a flow chart.  
Student A: That makes sense. So let’s make a list of all 
the research we need to do and start to divide up the tasks. 
 
A.  Students/Lawyers: Understanding their Roles and Goals 
So far, so good. Our student-lawyers seem to understand that they cannot 
begin their work without a plan, and they seem roughly to have formulated 
one. They have actually accomplished quite a complicated array of lawyering 
tasks pretty efficiently, so it will be helpful to unpack them.23 
The student-lawyers’ first objective was to determine whom to represent. 
This predicate question raises immediate issues of professional ethics, values 
and interests.24 To reach the conclusion they do, the students must have read 
Rule 1.7 on conflicts of interest25 and they should have considered 
commentary from family law practitioners about collective vs. individual 
representation.26 They had to weigh the possibility of diverging interests 
between their proposed clients Frankie and Saanvi against the added 
inconvenience and expense for the couple of having each party represented 
separately.  
The students’ choice to represent only Frankie is probably a wise one, and 
will merit further exploration in class. Both partners may have 
complementary goals for the moment, but there is no guarantee that that will 
always remain true: families are complicated, and on any number of issues 
what’s good for one partner may not remain equally advantageous for the 
other. It is not uncommon, though, for couples in the giddy throes of romance 
to have a difficult time envisioning a future that includes familial conflict, 
which is precisely why it is part of the family lawyer’s job to introduce the 
                                                 
23 Though the examination that follows just scratches the surface.  
24 Thus also immediately intertwining the ethical and professional exploration with 
doctrinal learning. 
25 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONFLICT, Rule 1.7: 
Conflict of Interest: Current Clients, available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_
of_professional_conduct/rule_1_7_conflict_of_interest_current_clients/. 
26 See Nancy R. Schembri, Prenuptial Agreements and the Significance of Independent 
Counsel, 17 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 313 (2003). See also, Steven H. Hobbs, Family 
Matters: Non-Waivable Conflicts of Interest in Family Law, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 57 
(1998) (considering matters in which representation cannot or should not be joint); but cf., 
Elizabeth Carter, Rethinking Premarital Agreements: A Collaborative Approach, 46 N. MEX. 
L. REV. 354 (2016) (arguing forcefully in favor of collaborative premarital contracts in which 
intended spouses retain shared counsel). 
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possibility.27 Already, our student-lawyers are confronting the extent to 
which sensitive and very emotional factors intersect with doctrinal ones in 
family law—perhaps not entirely distinctly from the way similar questions 
arise in other areas of law, but unusually pervasively and prominently in 
family representation.28  
With the matter of who they will represent resolved, our student-lawyers 
move onto their client’s primary presenting question: what are the legal 
consequences if she weds her partner, and what legal protections could her 
family avail itself of if they choose not to marry? To consider the dimensions 
of this question the student-lawyers will have to work on “goal setting” both 
with respect to clarifying the client’s objectives and to their own work plans. 
Let’s briefly consider each in turn. 
From the short dialogue excerpted in our vignette it is not immediately 
apparent exactly what the client’s goals are. We know she is undecided about 
getting married (do we really know why? does she?).29 Is she seeking legal 
information to guide her in making what is ultimately an intensely personal 
decision? Is one of the partners more inclined toward marriage than the other 
and hoping that legal counsel will be persuasive in a given direction? Or is 
this perhaps instead a purely pragmatic inquiry for Frankie, to figure out from 
a legal perspective exactly what benefits, privileges, and obligations marriage 
transmits so she can make a more informed decision?30 How does the 
possibility of introducing a child into the family factor in? To put a finer point 
on it, is the client’s goal purely gathering information from her lawyers, or 
does she want guidance and possibly additional legal work in order to secure 
the maximum possible legal protection for herself and her family?  
                                                 
27 See Christine Fletcher, 10 Things You Need to Know About Prenups, FORBES (Sep. 
18, 2018) available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinefletcher/2018/09/18/10-things-
you-need-to-know-about-prenups/#2118bc9662ba (urging readers to “hope for the best, but 
plan for the worst”). 
28 A point frequently made in casebook-driven family law courses as well. See, e.g.,  
DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. ROSS, DAVID D. MAYER & LINDA C. 
MCCLAIN, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 3 (4th ed. 2015) (pointing out to family law 
students that the subject is “rich in human challenges and emotions”). But perhaps not quite 
so viscerally encountered by its students? 
29 This is one of the places where Davis and Davenport’s insightful decision to set the 
simulation in the context especially pays off. In theory any couple could be asking such 
questions about whether they would or should get married. Yet it makes far more sense for 
a lesbian couple living in a time when same-sex marriage has only recently become 
universally available in the U.S. to be unusually thoughtful about marriage’s ramifications. 
30 Analyzing the impact of the Defense of Marriage Act prohibiting federal recognition 
of same-sex marriages, the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) identified 1138 
statutory provisions in the United States Code that accorded rights and privileges on the basis 
of marital status. Defense of Marriage Act: Update to the 1997 Report – 2004, available at 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. 
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At this point the student-lawyers do not necessarily know the answers to 
those questions,31 but already they know enough to begin to think about them. 
It is suggestive that Frankie is asking these questions of an attorney in the 
first place. After all, how frequent is it that a key stop for long-term 
committed partners deciding whether to marry involves extended 
consultation with lawyers? The students may conclude that this decision by 
the client is a simulation artificiality introduced to provide an opportunity for 
them to explore the question: why legal marriage? I would nevertheless invite 
them to respond realistically to everything in their simulation,32 and to try to 
use the oddness of the circumstances to complicate or sharpen their 
understanding of their client’s goals. Here that query could lead the students 
to be somewhat skeptical of their client’s actual desire for marriage. It could 
also lead to an examination of the client’s specific social context. Her lawyers 
know that she has come of age in a world where legal marriage was not an 
available option for her relationship.33 They might be prompted to want to 
learn more about Frankie’s hesitancy, and whether the recent(ish) legalization 
of same-sex marriage has some personal, familial, or cultural implications for 
Frankie that they are not fully aware of.34 That inquiry in turn might be 
helpful in aiding Frankie to further clarify and then meet her goals in 
consulting her attorneys. 
Notice, then, that on the client’s behalf our student-lawyers’ careful 
attention to her goals neatly epitomizes the description of the goal-setting 
element as elucidated in the Lawyering Method, which affirms that lawyers 
“must hear or propose explicit goals, identify implicit goals, and balance both 
                                                 
31 It may be that Frankie is not fully certain herself. 
32 My practice in simulation teaching is never to change what “clients” (often outside 
volunteers or paid actors) say or do, but instead to try to find a way to understand their 
conduct as part of their characters. Students sometimes comment on the effectiveness of 
those “playing” their clients, which usually prompts me to look slightly puzzled and profess 
not to be acquainted with the word “actor.” But even this fairly rigid approach to realism still 
leaves room for faculty intervention when needed. We can always use in-role devices like 
faculty-drafted emails from clients, etc. to add or correct facts that are crucial to the students’ 
progress in the case.  
33 A history which led to a great deal of confusion about the legal status of pre-Obergefell 
same-sex relationships. See Michael J. Higdon, While They Waited: Pre-Obergefell Lives 
and the Law of Nonmarriage, 128 YALE L. J. FORUM, 1 (2019).  
34 As the students will learn, Frankie is in fact experiencing a good deal of resistance to 
the “institutionalizing” of her relationship. Some of it stems from feminist critique of 
marriage itself, and some from an unwillingness to grant what has traditionally been a hostile 
state the power to define the private relationship she cherishes. For background underlying 
such considerations see Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 6 
OUT/LOOK 14, (1989); Katherine Franke, Same-Sex Marriage is a Mixed Blessing, NY 
TIMES, June 23, 2011, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html?mtrref=www.google.com&g
wh=0B7DB08E40BF752B6DCF9FA9D119DC7F&gwt.  
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against judgments about the [client’s] interests….”35  
Notice, too, that the vignette leaves off at exactly the point where the 
student-lawyers begin to establish goals for their own work on this portion of 
the case. Presumably in the next segment of their conversation the student-
lawyers will distill what they need to find out, and then they will begin their 
research. The effectiveness of that research can be evaluated in the next 
section of the course when the students will meet with Frankie to review her 
options. And both the efficacy and efficiency of the research goals and paths 
will be subject to critical examination, consistent with immersion 
methodology.36 
Having identified several possible client objectives and determined that 
they will treat them essentially as options along a decision tree that they will 
present when they next meet with their client, our student-lawyers begin to 
enumerate their research tasks. The student-lawyers’ “flowchart” idea is a 
rather astute plan. It shows a genuinely sophisticated understanding of the 
counseling work they are preparing for, in that they seem to grasp the 
contingent nature of client decision-making.37 The students also seem 
intuitively to discern that they can best help their client make a decision about 
marriage—her stated primary goal—by outlining both best- and worst-case 
protections for the client’s family in marital and non-marital scenarios.38 That 
perception in turn branches into their plans for further investigation of the 
kinds of private documents attorneys can provide to their clients to afford at 
least some of the protections automatically conferred by marriage.39  
Family law practitioners and professors would further be pleased to see 
that these students immediately comprehend how much the marriage/not 
                                                 
35 Experiential Learning Lab supra note ___. 
36 One of the benefits of an experiential immersion course is that researchers can pretty 
easily identify the successes and breakdowns in their research goals when they turn to use 
what they have found. In addition to evaluating their efficacy in setting their research goals 
I further ask students to look critically at their own efficiency in finding the information they 
sought. Repeating those two lines of critique—completeness and time investment—for all 
research work in the course helps delineate for students what the broad goals of research 
should always be. It also helps them teach themselves to refine their research paths within 
family law-specific material.  
37 See Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47 
VILL. L. REV. 161, 265-69 (2002) (considering the professional anxiety lawyers may 
experience from the limitations of their advisory roles, and “not having the final say in legal 
decisions” that they must in the end leave up to their clients). 
38 Meaning that they will have to look closely at questions of who can marry whom and 
by what means, as well as what marriage permits and what it requires. This should lead them 
next to study such issues as financial support obligations within marriage, property 
ownership status, healthcare access and determination, legal expectations (or not) of fidelity,  
39 Meaning that they will have to learn something about common estate-planning 
instruments such as powers of attorney, health proxies, and designations of conservatorship. 
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decision changes with the possibility of children. This is true both because 
the issues become more complicated40 and the stakes may become so much 
higher.41 Most practitioners would probably also be delighted to have their 
junior lawyers be at least passingly aware of billing matters and 
proportionality in regard to legal work. 
So our vignette suggests that the students have a lot on their plates even 
in this beginning stage of the simulation. But so far they do seem eager and 
equipped to handle it. 
 
B.  Professors/Case Supervisors: Establishing Achievable Goals for 
Integrated Learning 
What are the educational goals of this introductory segment of the 
immersion family law course?  
Well first, to learn some family law.42  
In all of our immersive family law courses this means developing a core 
understanding of the rules of law pertaining to the clients’ problems. Since 
my course is intended as an introduction to family equivalent to a more 
traditionally-taught casebook courses it additionally means that the legal 
principles studied should be consistent with those usually learned in any 
standard family law class. In an immersion class, though, we do mean “learn 
law” far more multi-dimensionally than may be true in traditional casebook 
courses. Yet we firmly believe that students also leave the class with at least 
as solid an understanding of the legal principles they have studied as they 
would have gained in a casebook-driven class. 
For this proposition we can turn to the reflections on experiential learning 
that abound in the legal pedagogy literature.43 To support the notion that 
learning by doing helps students master fundamental concepts we can turn to 
                                                 
40 Particularly given the biological reality that in the lesbian client’s scenario no child 
will be the direct biological descendant of both parents, which inevitably raises a host of 
legal issues pertaining either to assisted reproduction or to adoption. See Elizabeth A. Harris, 
Same-Sex Parents Still Face Legal Complications, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2017, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/gay-pride-lgbtq-same-sex-parents.html. 
41 Kris Franklin, “A Family Like Any Other Family:” Alternative Methods of Defining 
Family in Law, 18 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027, 1073-76 (1990-91) (considering 
nontraditional means of providing legal recognition for familial ties, and concluding that 
workable schemes were far more straightforward to construct for relations among adults than 
between adults and their children). 
42 Because at least my own version of Family Law in Practice is intended to be a 
reasonably comprehensive survey of common family law doctrine, I will have to ensure that 
students encounter in broad strokes most of the topics generally introduced in a basic family 
law course. Discussed further infra at ___. 
43 See Jennifer E. Spreng, Spirals and Schemas: How Integrated Courses in Law School 
Create Higher-Order Thinkers and Problem Solvers, 37 U. LAVERNE L. REV. 37, 43-50 
(2015). 
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other scholars’ examinations of the embedded learning in other disciplines: 
Bob Moses’s concretized teaching of positive and negative numbers by riding 
public transit, for example,44 or Aaron Pallas’s introduction to statistics 
methodology through group exploration of what it truly means for a number 
to be in the “middle” of a data set.45  
This kind of learning embodies what educational theorist Eleanor 
Duckworth deems “critical exploration.”46 Duckworth’s own research is 
centered in primary education, and she grounds her theories in the earlier 
thinking of Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder.47 Through examples of puzzles 
and projects that enable children to explore science, mathematics, spelling, 
and other basic educational topics, though, her work is universalized beyond 
child development. Moreover it neatly anticipates the kinds of learning that 
adult law students do in immersion courses. As Duckworth relates, she is 
“convinced that people must construct their own knowledge and must 
assimilate new experiences in ways that make sense to them…. [M]ore often 
than not, simply telling students what we want them to know leaves them 
cold.”48 Duckworth’s observation helps make it clear exactly why 
immersion—designed learning by doing—permits “learning law” much more 
meaningfully than casebook courses typically foster. The student-lawyers’ 
empathy for their clients, and simultaneous interest in their own experience 
working on the problems the clients present, give abstract operation of legal 
rules real context in precisely the way that Socratic hypotheticals aim for49 
but too rarely achieve.50  
                                                 
44 Detailed at length in ROBERT P. MOSES & CHARLES E. COBB, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS FROM 
MISSISSIPPI TO THE ALGEBRA PROJECT (2002).  
45 PALLAS, AARON M., & ANNA NEUMANN, CONVERGENT TEACHING: TOOLS TO SPARK 
DEEPER LEARNING IN COLLEGE 69-77 (2019) [hereinafter CONVERGENT TEACHING]. For 
further examples see Mary Kay Delany’s introduction to epistemology in high school social 
studies through examination of policies and perceptions of President Ronald Reagan. 
Understanding the Presidency, in “TELL ME MORE”: LISTENING TO LEARNERS EXPLAIN, 125 
(Eleanor Duckworth, ed. 1987). 
46 ELEANOR DUCKWORTH, “THE HAVING OF WONDERFUL IDEAS” AND OTHER ESSAYS 
ON TEACHING AND LEARNING, 140 (2006). 
47 Id. at 1-5, 15-16, 38-40. 
48 Id. at 173. 
49 For a thoughtful endorsement of the continuing value of well-considered Socratic case 
dialogue see Michal T. Gibson, A Critique of Best Practices in Legal Education: Five Things 
All Law Professors Should Know, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 30-61 (2012). 
50 Especially for all students equally. The nature of Socratic dialogue as it usually 
functions in the casebook law classroom tends to involve a solitary interlocutor conversing 
with one or only a very few students at a time. In theory all other students/observers are 
thoroughly engaged in critically considering both sides of this discourse, but it seems 
doubtful that those who are not part of the exchange remain attentively and fully engrossed 
at every moment. Jeremiah A. Ho, Function, Form, and Strawberries: Subverting Langdell, 
64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 656, 658-70 (2015). 
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Current learning theory may provide additional explanation for the 
unique value of immersive learning: it is frankly more complicated and more 
challenging. Scholars can debate the merits of complexity at various points 
in educational curricula (they have!),51 but there is little doubt that if we want 
to teach complicated things (we do!)52 at some point or other we will need to 
teach things in a way that is… complicated. With respect to retention of 
material learned53 psychologists even have a name for the effect of what they 
call “desirable difficulty.”54 We know that the harder human brains work to 
retrieve information the more strongly it is stored, and the more effortlessly 
it is retrieved later on.55 It accordingly makes sense that so-called “effortful” 
learning has been found to be less superficial and more long-lasting.56 So if 
learning of legal doctrine takes place in an immersive setting, and the 
immersion experience is more demanding, the body of current learning 
science should suggest at the very least that mastery of the rules should be 
more complete and more long-lasting.  
Some may wonder whether learning legal rules by immersion actually is 
harder than learning them in casebook courses.57 When it comes to the kind 
of curated experiences fictionalized in simulations, writers have suggested 
                                                 
51 See COMPLEXITY IN EDUCATION: FROM HORROR TO PASSION (Cok Bakker & Nicolina 
Montesano Montessori, eds. 2016). 
52 All law teachers must impart deep knowledge of intricate legal rules and exceptions, 
all while we are concurrently and always aiming to further refine the ineffable complexities 
of “thinking like a lawyer.” 
53 Which differs from initial mastery of concepts and skills, but is of course closely 
adjacent. 
54 Robert A. Bjork & Elizabeth Ligon Bjork, A New Theory of Disuse and an Old Theory 
of Stimulus Fluctuation, in 2 FROM LEARNING PROCESSES TO COGNITIVE PROCESSES 35 
(Alice F. Healy et al., eds., 1992). 
55 See generally, PETER C. BROWN, HENRY L. ROEDIGER III & MARK A. MCDANIEL, 
MAKE IT STICK: THE SCIENCE OF SUCCESSFUL LEARNING 67-101 (2014) (urging that for 
greater learning we should “embrace difficulties” and that “easier isn’t better”). 
56 Elizabeth Ligon Bjork & Robert A. Bjork, Making Things Hard on Yourself, But in a 
Good Way: Creating Desirable Difficulties to Enhance Learning, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
REAL WORLD: ESSAYS ILLUSTRATING FUNDAMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIETY 56 
(Morton Ann Gernsbacher et al., eds., 2009) 
57 And I suppose some might suggest that the stress of traditional cold-calling in many 
casebook-driven law classes is itself difficult. I’m quite sure it is, but I doubt that is precisely 
the kind of difficulty that the researchers had in mind for enhancing comprehension and 
recall. 
27-Feb-20] Method Lawyering 15 
that they tend to be “simpler”58 or at least insufficiently “messy.”59 I do not 
agree that simulations by their very nature must be comparatively 
uncomplicated.60 Quite the contrary, in fact, in the sense that they bring 
together so many dimensions of what we mean by “law.” And when 
considering only the narrow category of learning established black letter 
rules, it is hard to see how there can be substantial variation in difficulty 
whether those rules are learned in practical context rather compared to a more 
traditional case reading.  
But even though learning legal doctrine is absolutely central to the 
overarching goal to “learn some family law,” what we mean by that is also 
more ambitious than just mastery of statutes, cases, or concepts. Legal 
doctrine does not exist for its own sake—it is developed in the context of real 
human problems. Understanding how the law operates for the people who 
encounter it is part of truly comprehending what it is, and why it is that way. 
That’s how law students and lawyers move from “knowing” the law (being 
able to recap legal principles) to thoroughly knowing it (having thought 
deeply enough about legal principles to exercise good judgment about when 
they apply and predict how they might shift in new circumstances). 
Moreover, immersion teachers and our students include within the 
“learning law” umbrella a family-law-specific examination of client 
interviewing, counseling, research, advocacy, ethical questions and values 
inquiries, along with the rest of the extended list of the professional 
undertakings of lawyers. In so doing, we also take on the many goals of 
experiential education enumerated by Deborah Maranville and her 
colleagues: understanding unequal social structures, advancing social justice, 
developing lawyering skills, cultivating professional identity, fostering 
professional ethics, providing culturally competent client representation to a 
diverse array of clients, developing sound judgment and problem-solving 
                                                 
58 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Simulations: An Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 470 
(1995) (characterizing simulations as “more complex than doctrinal hypos, but lacking the 
intense reality of a live-client experience”), or Myths and Misconceptions, supra note ___ at 
32 (contending that simulations “necessarily simplify the factual and interpersonal 
complexity of actual lawyering). See also Margaret Moore Jackson, From Seminar to 
Simulation: Wading Out to the Third Wave, 19 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 138-39 (2016) 
(describing “what simulation teaching may do less well”). 
59 Comments attributed to Dean Erwin Chermerinsky of U.C. Irvine, quoted in No More 
Casebooks, supra note ___ at 706. 
60 It certainly helps in creating rich and deeply realistically complex characters and 
situations to have the unique contributions of a talented playwright like Danielle Davenport. 
Legal educators could probably gain a lot from more widespread cross-pollination with 
creative disciplines. Yet as enormously valuable as Davenport’s collaboration was for our 
particular immersion courses, I do not think finding non-legal contributors is a sine qua non, 
and the absence of such a collaborator should not be a barrier to immersion for law professors 
working on their own. 
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abilities, gaining insight into law and the legal system, promoting lifelong 
learning, and learning to work collaboratively.61 In short, our goal of learning 
law is as expansive as the meaning of the word itself. 
One immediate example is the student-lawyers’ insight into the 
“flowchart nature” of their impending client counseling session that I have 
already praised. An overarching goal of legal education is helping law 
students understand and develop skills for their role in helping clients solve 
problems.62 The progressive nature of the various decisions their client will 
have to make and the information she needs to make her choices almost force 
the student-lawyers to become more thoughtful about the interrelationship 
between legal information and client decision-making. One goal down, and 
certainly plenty of other examples can be found. 
Once we have established “learning some family law” in an intricate and 
multi-faceted way as our encompassing teaching objective, it may be helpful 
to consider some of the logistical details involved in trying to meet those 
objectives. 
We find that many of our approaches are consistent with those outlined 
by other law teachers reflecting on their simulation-based coursework, so 
there is no need to rehash what has been amply communicated by so many 
colleagues. Instead then, I outline here several of the operational decisions 
that seem not to have been adopted by others, or are at least not fleshed out 
in other published works. 
The first is the strategic use of structured team-based research 
assignments. In my course students organize themselves into teams of three 
or at most four student-lawyers, and once the teams are formed they are 
chunked into groupings designated A, B and C.63 It is not unusual in 
experiential law classes to have students work in teams (often dubbed “law 
                                                 
61 Deborah Maranville, Mary A. Lynch, Susan L. Kay, Phyllis Goldfarb & Russell 
Engler, Re-Vision Quest: A Law School Guide to Designing Experiential Courses Involving 
Real Lawyering, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 527 (2011/2012). 
62 A prodigious volume of writing directed at law students, and about the profession 
generally, focuses on the modern attorney’s primary responsibility to serve as a “problem 
solver” for clients. For just one prominent example, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When 
Winning Isn’t Everything, the Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2000). 
Perhaps this also explains the common law school graduation gift of a mug emblazoned with 
Lawyer: Because Badass Problem Solver is not an Official Job Title. 
63 The idea of dividing teams into groupings and assigning differing preparations 
emphases was originated by Peggy Cooper Davis in her version of the course. My specific 
research assignments and focuses diverge from hers due to the differing nature of our 
courses, but I was happy to adopt her effective and efficient approach. 
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firms”64). And there are tremendous advantages to learning in teams,65 not 
the least of which is that knowing how to work collaboratively has frequently 
been identified as a crucial skill within the legal profession and beyond.66  
An innovation in our particular immersion classes is to use the differing 
letter designations to manage workload and to more comprehensively 
exemplify the kinds of inquiries expected of attorneys by frequently posing 
differing—albeit occasionally overlapping—research preparation 
assignments to differently-lettered teams. For example, after meeting the 
client and planning their work as shown in our vignette, my own students 
would begin with some background reading that the partner in their firm 
would provide (e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges67) and would then consider a more 
focused question depending on their team’s designation, such as:  
A. Who is eligible to be married in our state, and what procedures does 
the jurisdiction require?  
B. Does our state recognize domestic partnerships, and if so how are they 
similar to or dissimilar from legal marriage?  
C. What is common law marriage, does our state recognize it, and is there 
any possibility our client already has one?  
In class meetings, student teams can report on their own research, ensure that 
their findings and analysis were consistent with other teams sharing their 
letter designation, and ask questions of groups that focused in other areas. 
Divvying up the questions this way serves one faculty goal of ensuring that 
all of these topics are considered, and another faculty goal of exposing all 
students to many topics without ending up spending too much time on any 
                                                 
64 E.g. No More Casebooks, supra note ___ at 702. Forming student working groups 
called law firms is a pretty widespread practice in many classrooms. See, e.g., Robert G. 
Vaugh, Use of Simulations in a First-year Civil Procedure Class, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 480, 
481 91995); Lloyd B. Snyder, Teaching Students How to Practice Law: A Simulation Course 
in Pretrial Practice, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 515 (1995).  
65 In fact, there are well-developed theories of best practices for team-based learning that 
have been employed in other disciplines for decades, and used effective in law classrooms 
for some time. See Sophie M. Sparrow & Margaret Sova McCabe, Team-Based learning in 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 153 (2012). Since it has a different structure and design I 
cannot claim that my course fully follows all of the systems identified as components for 
effective “team-based learning.” Perhaps, then, that designation does not fully fit the 
pedagogy of my class. Nonetheless our objectives and procedures are similar (and I hope 
complementary) so whether or not Family Law in Practice is considered a “team-based 
learning course,” it is certain that there is significant learning both within and about 
functioning professional teams. 
66 See BEST PRACTICES, supra note ___ at 77; Sophie M. Sparrow, Can They Work Well 
on a Team?, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1162, 1162-64 (2012) (considering the strong desire 
in the legal profession for law graduates who are well-prepared to function as effective team 
members).  
67 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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one of them.68 Since several teams share the same letter designation and 
therefore the same assignments they can compare their work with others, so 
that collectively the class has achieved some specialization, coverage, and 
contrast for self-critique, all without unhelpful duplication of student effort. 
Yet another difference from most casebook courses (and many clinical 
ones) is my insistence that students reflect explicitly and critically on their 
research paths.69 Self-reflection is quite naturally a key component of any 
immersive learning. It may be the singular hallmark of what law professors 
consider “clinical method.”70 It is therefore frequent in clinical education that 
students are asked to be thoughtfully reflective about their lawyering 
interactions such as meetings with clients or witnesses, their appearances in 
court or at hearings, and so on. But there are fewer opportunities in law school 
for budding lawyers to turn their attention directly to surveying and 
improving their own research work and learning processes. That’s a shame. 
An entire body of literature on the value of metacognition suggests that the 
more students are conscious of how they are learning, the more effective 
learners they will become.71 
 
II. INTERPRETING FACTS 
Student B: That was a really productive meeting with 
Frankie! 
Student C: Yeah, I feel like we have a much clearer 
direction to go in now. 
Student A (jumping in): Sure, we have a better sense of 
what our tasks are and what she is saying she would want. 
I mean, obviously we’re going to need to know a lot more 
about property ownership, mortgages, taxes, and so on. But 
did anyone else feel like Frankie wasn’t being super-
realistic about the financial considerations in their 
relationship? It seemed to me Frankie had a hard time 
                                                 
68 Even though this particular example does not show it, it is common for one of the pre-
assigned questions to be about lawyering process, such as “How should an excellent attorney 
conduct this initial client meeting?” That meets the dual goals of creating an opportunity to 
be explicit in learning/reviewing key lawyering skills, and of making that project seem equal 
in significance to learning about the legal rules governing the problem. It is my habit to rotate 
letter assignments so that the more process-oriented questions move around to differently- 
designated teams. 
69 Discussed supra, note ___ and accompanying text. 
70 CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note ___ at 23-24. 
71 See, generally, HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note ____ at 47-48; MICHAEL HUNTER 
SCHWARTZ & PAULA J. MANNING, EXPERT LEARNING FOR LAW STUDENTS (3d ed. 2018) 
(applying metacognitive techniques to law student learning).  
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acknowledging quite how dependent their lives are on 
Saanvi’s income and assets, which are so much greater 
than hers. 
Student C: That’s true. I think she doesn’t think about—
or doesn’t want to think about—how much their 
comparative finances have changed. She was fine sharing 
expenses early in their relationship when she had more 
money but neither of them had very much, but now that 
Saanvi has a lot of money it seems like she is more reluctant 
to consider everything they have as joint. 
Student B: I actually really admire Frankie for wanting 
to feel like Saanvi’s financial equal, but it’s scaring me in 
terms of writing a prenup.  
Student A: Yes. I am certainly glad we’re the ones 
writing the first draft, not Saanvi’s lawyers! But I feel pretty 
torn here between our obligations to look out for Frankie’s 
best interests, and on the other hand to draft this document 
the way she has suggested she wants. 
Student C: I know! Frankie’s not necessarily looking 
out for her own best interests. 
Student A: Do you think she was thinking aloud, or that 
she definitely meant what she said about all of the stuff 
that’s in Saanvi’s name staying that way? My sense is that 
without a premarital agreement, if they were to get 
divorced somewhere down the line Frankie would be 
entitled to a lot more. I don’t think she has really thought 
through what it would be like if they ever broke up. 
Student C: We’d have to know a lot more about what a 
divorce would look like in our state without a prenup, and 
how stuff would get divided, before we can think through 
the options and terms we should present to Frankie. 
Student B: By the way, have either of you drafted a 
prenup before? I know I haven’t, and I don’t really know 
where to start. 
 
A.  Students/Lawyers: Defining Facts Needed to Complete a Task 
From this new vignette it is apparent that our student-lawyers are now 
presented with a clearly defined lawyering task. We learn that they are 
preparing to draft a prenuptial agreement, which suggests that the client has 
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decided to legally marry.72 The vignette also establishes that the partners, 
probably acting wisely upon advice of counsel, plan to consider ways to 
address some significant differences in their assets and income before they 
wed.  
The next steps for the student-lawyers would seem to be: 
1. Finding out as much as possible about both Frankie’s and Saanvi’s 
current earnings and property; 
2. Learning more about both partners’ careers, investments and family 
backgrounds, so that to the extent possible their individual and joint 
assets can be projected to the future; 
3. Gathering information about wealth- and estate- planning, including 
how federal and state taxation would treat the family currently and 
whether there are more advantageous ways for them to structure 
their money; 
4. Familiarizing themselves with the marital property dissolution 
scheme in their state to contrast it with whatever premarital 
agreement(s) might be on the table; 
5. Drafting a prenuptial contract that would protect Frankie’s economic 
interests in the case of a divorce; and finally, 
6. Presenting that draft agreement (or perhaps several alternative 
approaches to a possible agreement) to Frankie in a meeting in 
which the attorneys explain their concerns about her financial 
security and then seek to implement her decisions. 
Steps 3 and 4 fall squarely within the category of understanding and using 
legal rules, step 6 pretty clearly involves a great deal of “managing 
interactions,” and step 5 probably combines the two. This segment of the 
Article concerns itself primarily with the fact-gathering required to begin the 
work at hand. 
So exactly what facts do the student-lawyers need to perform their work, 
and how will they get them? Legal work is always intensely fact-bound, but 
in what ways—and where those facts come from—can differ enormously.73 
Advocacy settings, for example, pose the unique complexity of necessitating 
both the most objective read available and the ultimate need for creative 
structuring of the most favorable slant possible in the circumstances.74 For 
                                                 
72 Lawyers for Frankie should at least consider the outside possibility that both the client 
and her partner could be using the term “pre-nuptial” colloquially, and that they are seeking 
a relationship contract but have no immediate plans to legally wed. But that seems unlikely, 
and it is probably safe to assume that Frankie and Saanvi want to get married. 
73 See W. Bradley Wendel, Whose Truth? Objective and Subjective Perspectives on 
Truthfulness in Advocacy, 28 YALE J. LAW & HUM. 105 (2016). 
74 As the Lawyering Elements explain, interpreting facts is rarely a simple matter, “for 
facts are rarely certain and always subject to varying interpretations.” Experiential Learning 
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less-contested legal work75 like the planning documents sought here the 
assembling of facts may be more linear, but it is never effortless. Because the 
matters we handle are always personally consequential, lawyers must work 
tirelessly to collect as much information about their clients’ circumstances as 
they can.76 
For crafting a prenuptial contract, the facts our family lawyers need to 
work with will almost all be based within their client’s financial realities.77 
Personal issues are hard. And money questions are especially personal, 
therefore especially hard to talk about. We learn in the vignette that the 
student-lawyers have discovered there is a considerable disparity between 
their clients’ fortune and her partner’s. As well as, apparently, some 
touchiness around her feelings of dependency. This could make the fact 
gathering required in this situation unusually thorny. The student-lawyers 
will have to be thoughtful about what information they need and where they 
will get it, as well as being careful about how they deliver their inquiries. 
Their first steps should be to go beyond the descriptive information 
available from conversations with their client and to seek to review as much 
documentary evidence as they can reasonably78 obtain. That can provide 
more concrete and indisputable information than would be obtained orally, 
while simultaneously helping to circumvent the awkwardness of asking some 
questions in person. They may want to ask for bank statements, copies of W-
2s or tax returns, mortgage papers, and so on.  
What’s particularly complicated is that it would be very helpful to see 
such materials for both Frankie and Saanvi. Yet not only is Saanvi not their 
client, she is represented by separate counsel. The student-lawyers now have 
both a client to gather information from79 and someone who is essentially a 
                                                 
Lab, supra note ___. See also § 13.4 Developing a Unifying Theme in STEFAN H. KRIEGER 
& RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 174-83 (4th ed. 2011 but 
probably not the most recent). 
75 One important distinction between legal counsel and advice from other kinds of 
professionals is that lawyers are trained always to operate within the shadow of potential 
litigation. Even in purely transactional work, lawyers are often taught to anticipate and 
mitigate risk in the eventuality of partnerships not working out. See STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK 
& JOHN FRANCIS HILSON, TRANSACTIONAL SKILLS: HOW TO STRUCTURE AND DOCUMENT A 
DEAL 6-11 (2015). 
76 As Mary Pat Treuthart exemplifies, teachers of family law courses routinely 
emphasize “the importance of listening, really listening, to what the client is saying, and not 
saying.” A Perspective on Teaching and Learning Family Law, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1047, 
1051 (2007). 
77 GARY N. SKOLOFF, RICHARD H. SINGER, JR. & RONALD L. BROWN, DRAFTING 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS, (2019 supp.). 
78 “Reasonable” meaning without being too intrusive, and without incurring 
unwarranted attorneys’ fees in the process. 
79 Susan L. Turley contends that lawyers should always see interviewing clients (and 
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third-party (at least to their representation)80 that they need to consult with. 
All while respecting that in seeking the information they need, they are 
wading into private matters between life partners. The attorneys will have to 
be savvy about assessing their priorities, and then they’ll need to decide from 
whom and how they should ask for those materials.81  
 Now, assume for the moment that our student-lawyers were wildly 
successful in that project and somehow magically obtained every single piece 
of paper that they could possibly wish to get their hands on, and that they 
meticulously pored through them. Would they then have all the facts they 
needed? Hardly. At best this would only provide a slice of the present facts. 
Even those may be unclear or subject to interpretation.82 Drafting planning 
documents like prenuptial agreements entails understanding the facts when 
the contract becomes operative—i.e., at some undetermined possible point in 
the future. Future “facts” are not actually facts, they are speculation of 
possible scenarios that may unfold. But they are also the contingencies upon 
which the legal analysis to be done now (legal reasoning being at base the 
application of rules to facts), hinges. Or to put it differently, the efficacy of 
our lawyers’ current drafting project depends on what the facts will become. 
Those can be anticipated but cannot yet be actually known.  
For our student-lawyers, planning in this way will help solidify their grasp 
of the imaginative process that is so often a part of legal work with facts. 
Sometimes that imagination leads to creative avenues of investigation.83 
Sometimes it involves envisioning what is not currently established but might 
be true and then asking questions or collecting evidence to find out whether 
it actually is. Other times, as here, it involves wading into the vast chasm of 
uncertainty that lawyers’ greatest challenge is to manage.84 In many practice 
                                                 
others) as a key tool of research for lawyers. I completely agree. “To See Between”: 
Interviewing as Legal Research Tool, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 283 (2010). 
80 Experts in interviewing emphasize the importance of “parallel universe” thinking 
when seeking to elicit information through conversation. See CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra 
note ___ at 258-59. 
81 Raising interesting complexities in managing interactions, and thus exposing how 
interconnected and overlapping the various Lawyering Elements actually are. Supra note 
____.  
82 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW, 7 (2000). 
83 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Problem Solving and 
Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (2001). This is also undoubtedly 
why a law school text devoted to interviewing and counseling skills so heavily stresses 
maintaining an open perspective when working with clients. STEPHEN ELLMANN, et al. 
LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 16-17 (2009). 
84 CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note ___, at 19-21, positions “improving capacities to 
manage uncertainty” as a central component of the third goal of all legal clinical education. 
See also ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO THINK LIKE A 
LAWYER, 66-67 (2007) (observing the “epistemological uncertainty” in which law students 
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circumstances, treating things that are not actually factual as contingent but 
potential “facts” is a necessary component of lawyers’ thinking. Within a 
cautious profession predicated on trying to be correct, handling uncertainly 
is probably one of the hardest things new lawyers need to learn.85 
Nevertheless, our role as counselors-at-law frequently obliges us to give the 
best advice we can even about uncertain prospects. In short, to help clients 
manage a never-entirely-knowable present and a changeable future.  
Turning back to the reality that they will probably never have every single 
piece of evidence they could ever hope to obtain,86 the next key question for 
our student-lawyers will be: how will they know when they have done enough 
gathering and interpreting the facts in their case? Professors teaching students 
to conduct legal research frequently stress the need to find some ending 
point.87 The difficulty of deciding that enough is enough extends equally to 
factual research. Lawyers need to become comfortable with probably 
overshooting their research targets to the point of repetition or diminishing 
returns just to ensure relative completeness, while also aiming to do so with 
as much economy of time as possible. That requires training and experience, 
which our student-lawyers are happily beginning to accrue. 
 
B.  Professors/Case Supervisors: Considering the Factual Context for 
Developing and Teaching an Immersive Course 
What are the “facts” of a sound legal education? That is to say, given an 
expectation of lifelong learning and refining expertise, what is it that we in 
the profession believe law graduates and new lawyers must have learned?  
Clearly there is no single definitively-accepted answer to that question, 
hence the endless debates within the academy about curriculum, skills and 
values training, or subject matter knowledge—as well as the ongoing calls 
for transformational change that the Carnegie Report88 and so many law 
                                                 
begin to understand what attorneys mean by “facts.”). 
85 See, for example, the extended dialogue intended to illustrate for law students the 
challenge and importance of operating in a “world full of wicked ‘whiches’” in RICHARD 
MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMEY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL ON LAW SCHOOL 
EXAMS, 109-16 (1999). 
86 Really, how would they ever be able to know that for sure even if they did? 
87 Major legal research texts uniformly include advice on when to keep going and at 
what point to stop. See, e.g., AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND 
STRATEGIES, ___ (7th ed. 2018) (on “deciding when to stop”); CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, et al., 
THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH, 10 (8th ed. 2012) (on “stopping”). 
88 Published as WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD 
BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF 
LAW (2007) [hereinafter, CARNEGIE REPORT]. Prior to that, related propositions about the 
need for at least som reform in legal education methods was put for the in the MacCrate 
Report. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING 
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school critics recommend. As has already been noted, though, we do all seem 
to reconcile into a general concurrence that practice-ready law graduates must 
have a complementary balance of a basic knowledge of legal rules, sharp 
analytical skills, and meaningful introduction to many and varied tasks of the 
profession like reading, researching, writing, advocating, speaking 
persuasively, and working effectively both with other professionals and with 
clients.  
Our vignette helps illustrate that immersive learning of legal doctrine 
embedded in context readily combines all of those components of preparing 
for a legal career.89 Our student-lawyers have not yet studied the rules that 
govern the financial decisions their client must make, but they themselves 
recognize that they must learn about “property ownership, mortgages, taxes, 
and so on,” as well as finding out about the marital property division rules 
operating in their state. Moreover, they seem to treat that legal knowledge in 
precisely the way law professors would want them to: as required baseline 
information which must then be applied to a specific factual context (that is, 
Frankie’s).  
It is not inconsequential, though, that these students have essentially 
assigned themselves the project of mastering this sometimes-dense material. 
A significant body of research shows that feelings of personal agency and 
autonomy can enhance learning.90 Further work suggests the most common 
learning modes in traditional law school classes may interfere with student 
autonomy and self-efficacy,91 while enhanced autonomy positively impacts 
both law student happiness and learning itself.92 
                                                 
THE GAP (1992), available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_leg
al_education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).authcheckdam.pdf.  
89 It even introduces the kinds of transactional planning work that some critics suggest 
is often underemphasized current legal education. For a summary of commentary on the need 
for more teaching of transactional skills in law schools, see Carol Goforth, Transactional 
Skills Training Across the Curriculum, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 904 (2017). 
90 Allison D. Martin & Kevin L. Rand, The Future’s So Bright I Gotta Wear Shades: 
Law School through the Lens of Hope, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 203, 214-217 (2010); Carol L. 
Wallinger, Autonomy Support 101: How Using Proven Autonomy Support Techniques Can 
Increase Law Student Autonomy, Engender Hope, and Improve Outcomes, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 
385, 396-98 (2010) 
91 See Larry Krieger & Kennon Sheldon, Does Legal Education Have Undermining 
Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 
BEHAV. SCH. LAW 261, 262-67 (2004); see also Corie Rosen, Creating the Optimistic 
Classroom: What Law Schools Can Learn from Attribution Style Effects, 42 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 319, 324 (2011) (locating destabilizing effects of legal education across types of 
courses and law schools). 
92 See Louis N. Schultz & A. Adam Ding, Alternative Justifications for Academic 
Support III: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Academic Support and Humanizing Law 
School, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 999, 1002-11 (2012) (reviewing literature supporting the 
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Impressively, our student-lawyers easily blend their doctrinal questions 
with their intrapersonal ones: they know both that they must learn more about 
the areas of law they plan to research and that having that information will 
not alone be sufficient to resolve the client’s current insistence on entirely 
separating her wealth from her betrothed’s. These students’ contextual legal 
work not only helps erase the doctrine/skills divide,93 it may also enhance the 
transfer of learning from one setting to another.  
Educational theorists use the term “transfer” to describe learning that 
takes place in one context being used in another.94 Anyone who has ever 
taught, well… anything, probably recognizes the exceeding difficulty of 
helping learners transfer prior knowledge95 to new settings, and of getting 
them to deploy it effectively. It could be argued that learning which is not 
transferred is not actually learned at all—otherwise, it would have been 
available for use in new circumstances. Researchers who study learning have 
found that a good way to increase transfer is to provide multiple opportunities 
for learners to practice applying what they are learning,96 ideally in 
circumstances that will help them see the underlying functions of the matter  
(its “deep structure”97) rather than becoming fixated on surface-level 
commonalities or distinctions.98 Immersion work automatically and of 
                                                 
positive impact of greater student autonomy in law schools); Paula J. Manning, 
Understanding the Impact of Inadequate Feedback: A Means to Reduce Law Student 
Psychological Distress, Increase Motivation, and Improve Learning Outcomes, 43 CUMB. L. 
REV. 225, 229-33 (2013) (summarizing proven effects of self-determination and autonomy 
support on achievement). 
93 As Kristen Holmquist observes: “the result of drawing artificial boundaries between 
the cognitive and the practical is to limit what it means to think like a lawyer…” Challenging 
Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353, 365 (2012). 
94 HOW PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL, 51 (John D. 
Bransford, Ann L. Brown, and Rodney R. Cocking, eds. 2000).  
95 The term “prior knowledge” has a specific and important meaning in educational 
theory. Students connect what they learn to things they already know, and research suggests 
that can often be a helpful scaffold to learning, but also sometimes a hindrance if the activated 
prior knowledge is insufficient or inappropriate. For a useful overview of research on prior 
knowledge in learning theory see SUSAN A. AMBROSE et al., HOW LEARNING WORKS: 7 
RESEARCH-BASED PRINCIPLES FOR SMART TEACHING, 10-39 (2010). 
96 ROBERT E. HASKELL, TRANSFER OF LEARNING: COGNITION, INSTRUCTION AND 
REASONING 45-47 (2001). 
97 DANIEL T. WILLINGHAM, WHY DON’T STUDENTS LIKE SCHOOL?: A COGNITIVE 
SCIENTIST ANSWERS QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THE MIND WORKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR 
THE CLASSROOM, 133-37 (2009)  (observing that experts are able to transfer knowledge and 
think more abstractly than novices because they organize well-understood material much 
more conceptually).  
98 See generally, Mary Nicol Bowman & Lisa Brodoff, Cracking Student Silos: Linking 
Legal Writing and Clinical Learning Through Transference, 25 CLINICAL L. REV. 269, 280-
81 (2019) (considering ways to facilitate transfer of skills between first-year legal writing 
classes and upper-level clinical courses). 
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necessity requires that kind of practice. It also pushes students toward higher-
order thinking about the law at issue,99 which likely generates the sort of 
deeper comprehension that is indispensable for transfer. 
Meanwhile, in addition to considering the “facts” of what we want 
students to learn in law school, legal educators must also be cognizant of our 
own factual contexts. If many disparate scholars have suggested reforming 
legal education, and a wide variety of thinkers are already invested in 
integrative learning in law schools, what realities on the ground are 
preventing it from becoming more pervasive? 
One certainly is the always-present limitation of time. No one ever has 
enough of it, and law professors are hardly immune from time constraints. 
There are few readily-available products that can immersively structure an 
entire semester-long or year-long inquiry into a subject in the way that more 
traditional casebooks do. So creating an immersion course currently requires 
a sizeable investment of time that creating a casebook-driven course may 
not.100 Furthermore, the differential time investment may not end after a one-
time investment in course design. Instead, immersive classes require ongoing 
supervision of student work, including review of students’ planning, research, 
performance with clients and supervisors, and of course comments on their 
writing.  
But there are ways to control at least some of the faculty workload in 
these courses. Having students work in teams, for example, fractionalizes the 
number of individual papers to be reviewed. Assigning students to reflect on 
some of their work processes, performances, and products—in addition to 
being a key practice for self-regulated learning—has the benefit of giving the 
faculty member a concrete summary and a sense of the students’ own 
understanding of their work to concentrate their responses upon. Guidelines 
or rubrics can also be introduced to help faculty members streamline their 
feedback and maximize the information conveyed while reducing the time 
invested.101 Moreover, as more and more law schools are encouraging or even 
requiring formative assessments that add to faculty workloads,102 the 
                                                 
99 That is to say, toward the highest levels in Bloom’s Taxonomy of Evaluating, or even 
Creating. This compares favorably to casebook learning of legal doctrine, which aims 
primarily at achieving the intermediate levels of Applying legal rules and Analyzing them in 
factual context, and despite the best intentions of its users may at times only accomplish the 
introductory cognition levels of Remembering or Understanding the rules introduced. 
BENJAMIN BLOOM, et al., TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: HANDBOOK 1, THE 
COGNITIVE DOMAIN (1956). 
100 Perhaps over time the legal academy or some external commercial enterprise may 
address that imbalance? 
101 See, e.g., Sophie Sparrow, Describing the Ball: Improve Teaching by Using Rubrics 
– Explicit Grading Criteria, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1. 
102 Olympia Duhart, The ‘F’ Word: the Top Five Complaints (and Solutions) About 
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distinction between the time commitments involved in immersive teaching 
and more traditional casebook teaching may be growing less distinct. Despite 
all of the many strategies that can make this kind of teaching manageable, 
though, there is no denying that it can be a lot of work. And there remains the 
unequivocal factual reality that for sheer logistical reasons, immersive class 
size must usually be smaller than it is in casebook lecture courses.103 This is 
hopefully offset by the educational value for students and the unalloyed 
enjoyment it can offer faculty. 
Another concern for many law faculty members is expertise. Or more 
accurately, a comfort with their own expertise (or their ability to develop it) 
with respect to the material of a subject they might teach, but discomfort with 
the limitless array of mastery that immersion learning entails. It’s reasonable 
to recognize that few of us feel equally capable of teaching legal doctrine, 
reviewing legal writing, supervising students’ interactions with clients and 
experts, commenting on their research strategies, and so on. And probably for 
good reason. There are decades of accreted wisdom to assimilate in every one 
of these fields. Yet law professors routinely take on the teaching of new 
subjects despite our not-yet-fully-developed proficiency in teaching them. 
We hope and expect that we will do reasonably well to begin with, and will 
get better over time. Too, are not most law professors already specialists in 
legal research, legal analysis and legal writing? Many have also practiced law 
in the areas in which they teach, but for those who have not there is perhaps 
the option of co-teaching an immersive course with another law professor or 
an adjunct faculty practitioner who possesses the requisite experience. 
We expect law students and beginning lawyers to develop a divergent 
collection of professional competencies.104 We tell students no one expects 
them to be perfect in all arenas at once, and that the vulnerability they feel in 
learning to do something they have not done before is not a weakness—it is 
a vital precursor to growth. Can we really expect any less of ourselves? 
 
III. INTERPRETING RULES 
 
Student C: I think it’s great that Frankie and Saanvi 
                                                 
Formative Assessment, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 536-38 (2018).  
103 For example my Family Law in Practice course currently caps at twenty-eight 
registrants. That’s considerably fewer than a more traditional family law survey course may 
enroll, but it is still a reasonably economical way to deliver a high-quality educational 
experience to plenty of law students.  
104 For one example of the myriad skills needed for law practice, see the twenty-six 
Shultz-Zedeck Lawyering Effectiveness Factors identified in the research undertaken on 
behalf of the Law School Admissions Council. Quoted in Marjorie M. Schultz & Sheldon 
Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis for Law school Admissions 
Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 620 (2011). 
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want to have kids. It seems like they’ll be excellent parents. 
Student B: I agree, but I feel thrown by the whole donor 
idea. 
Student A: In what way? 
Student B: Well, maybe I’m being too rigid here, but the 
idea of a kid having up to four parents is kind of freaking 
me out. Two moms and two dads? And don’t get me started 
on how this could work legally. It could be a total mess! 
Student A: I don’t really feel that way, to be honest. But 
on the other hand, I also don’t know how we could set up 
legally-binding agreements among all four of them. We 
know Frankie and Saanvi’s situation, but what do we really 
know about Victor and Anthony? Can they both be legal 
parents of this still-hypothetical child? Are they even 
legally married, and would that matter with respect to 
parentage? Can there possibly be any precedent for this 
anywhere?  
Student B: Exactly! 
Student A: And what if Frankie and Saanvi decide this 
is all too complicated for them. Could it be possible for 
Anthony or Victor to be a known donor yet not be a legal 
father? 
Student C: But don’t forget they’ve said they weren’t 
necessarily set on the “they are all parents” arrangement. 
It’s just one possibility. 
Student B: In terms of legal parenting protection, this is 
whole thing is scaring me. I can’t imagine we can tell them 
anything with any kind of certainty, no matter how we feel 
about it personally.  
Student C: Look, somebody always had to take a risk on 
the outcome for every big change that has ever happened in 
the law. Isn’t it actually our client’s job to decide how much 
risk she can accept? 
Student A: Ok, but do Frankie and Saanvi even know 
what the risks are? Do we? 
Student C: Folks, we’re getting way ahead of ourselves 
by worrying primarily about the most unusual scenario. 
The women don’t even know for certain that that’s what 
27-Feb-20] Method Lawyering 29 
they want. Our main concern here is with Frankie and 
Saanvi and their legal relationship with this child. If they 
have a child with a donor, is it legally equally both of 
theirs? Do we have to do some work to make even that 
happen, no matter whether there are dads we need to worry 
about or not? 
Student B: That’s helpful. I guess we’d better start 
looking at the legal ramifications of one, two, three, or four 
parents, since we’re going to have to talk Frankie through 
all of them. So where do we start? 
 
A.  Students/Lawyers: Understanding Boundaries and Possibilities in 
the Interpretation of Legal Rules 
This vignette puts our student-lawyers in the position of having to clarify 
the current legal rules pertaining to the parentage of a child born in a same-
sex marriage, in which it is not biologically possible for one child to be the 
genetic offspring of both spouses. Since most traditional parentage law arose 
in the context of opposite-sex spouses conceiving children or adopting them 
together, this will require some interpretive extrapolation of that body of law 
to extend to the client’s potential circumstances. Reams of meditative 
commentary have been written about the kinds of reasoning that legal 
interpretation consists of105 and it is not the project of this Article to review 
all of them or to add substantially to that body of thought. Instead it may be 
valuable to look more narrowly at what our particular student-lawyers will 
have to do with rules of law for the work they now find themselves engaged 
in. 
Of course the process of “interpreting rules” usually originates first in 
fully comprehending the present legal regime through the process of 
finding/knowing, stating accurately, and meticulously applying the laws that 
currently exist to determine whether they irrefutably cover the facts at hand. 
If they do, the lawyers can probably proceed straightforwardly with their 
work by using those resolutions.106 The interpretive work (and for lawyers, 
                                                 
105 For one brief summary in a clinical context, see Robert D. Dinerstein & Elliot S. 
Milstein, The Indeterminacy of Law in CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note___;  see also Anya 
Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM & MARY L. REV., 435 (2018) (arguing that 
judges must embrace their opportunities and obligations to interpret through discretionary 
sources). 
106 Although if that outcome turns out to disadvantage their clients the next step may be 
to see if they can find a way to interpret the law differently. If so, then this becomes the place 
for capable advocacy. If not, then it is what it is. As the Lawyering Method observes, in 
finding and interpreting rules “there is an obligation both to be responsibly truthful and the 
serve clients faithfully… [which] requires negotiating tensions between the quest for a proper 
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the fun?) comes in when there are no clear answer to the client’s problem in 
the existing body of legal rules because the law is in flux, the facts are novel, 
or as we possibly have here, both. 
To answer their client’s immediate questions about parental rights if she 
and Saanvi were to add children to their family, our student-lawyers might 
therefore begin by thinking through the legal situation for similarly situated 
different-sex couples. They could then generate some sort of recent timeline 
understanding of how those rules of law have and sometimes have not been 
applied to same-sex couples. That is because family law has for generations 
been finding ways to protect the parenting rights of married opposite-sex 
couples using assisted reproductive technologies.107 Either due to courts’ pure 
lack of imagination about the possible multiplicity of family forms,108 
differences in legalization of the marital status of the adults,109 or outright 
bias,110 families with parents of the same gender have not always 
automatically been afforded the same recognition of their status. 
                                                 
or just result and the quest to prevail.” Experiential Learning Lab supra note ___. 
107 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973) 
(recognizing the husband of a woman artificially inseminated with a donor’s sperm as the 
lawful father of the child). Also see both the original and currently-revised versions of the 
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and the Uniform Status of Assisted Conception Act 
(USCACA) proffered by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, 
which include stratagems to ensure that both members of an infertile heterosexual couple 
will be seen as co-equal parents of a child they conceive through assisted reproduction. 
108 Particularly the until-recently-ubiquitous presumption that a child could have at most 
one parent of each gender at the same time. See, e.g., N.A.H. and A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 
357 (Sup. Ct. Colo. 2000) (“[b]ecause a can have only one legal father…”). Cf. Nancy D. 
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of 
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990) 
(early advocacy for legal recognition of more than one parent of the same gender). 
109 Prior to Obergefell v. Hodges, or to individual state determinations to solemnize 
same-sex marriage or provide comity to same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions. Same 
sex marriages still have an extraordinarily short history in the U.S., beginning slowly after 
first being recognized in Massachusetts in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 789 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2004). 
110 There were, of course, longstanding presumptions that gay men and lesbian were 
perforce unfit parents. For but one example see the saga of Sharon Bottoms, whose own 
mother successfully sued to remove her child from her care after Bottoms began a 
relationship with a women. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). It is occasionally 
hard to read some court decisions about legal parentage as grounded in anything but 
prejudice. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (denying 
legal parenthood to a now-divorced transgender husband of an inseminated wife, despite the 
state having listed him as the father on the child’s birth certificate, despite uncontested 
statutory authority conferring parenthood on the male spouse of a woman using donor 
insemination to conceive, and despite a “savings clause” in the state parentage act intended 
to provide for legal fatherhood even in the event the marriage conferring that status was 
subsequently deemed invalid, as this one had been.) 
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Once they begin their research our student-lawyers will find they have to 
sort through some earlier cases in their states recognizing (or not) de facto 
parents,111 cases granting (or not) “second parent” adoptions112 to previously-
nonlegal same-sex parents, and will have to discover whether post-
Obergefell, their state now permits married partners of the same gender to be 
listed together parents on a child’s birth certificate from the time of 
delivery113 without the requirement of an adoption or any further judicial 
action. That is a dizzying set of evolutions in the law to get to the present 
rules, and understanding the history of these changes may be crucial for 
anyone who seeks to give advice about how the law would treat parentage for 
a family like Frankie’s and Saanvi’s. 
All this just to understand the law governing the most straightforward 
possibility the vignette suggests Frankie and Saanvi might consider: having 
a child who is the biological progeny of one of the women in the partnership, 
gestated by her with the intention of producing issue of the marriage, with no 
plan for legal involvement by the sperm donor.  
Then the student-lawyers will have to consider ramifications of 
associated alternatives their client might select, including: What if the couple 
decides to expand their family by adoption rather than pregnancy? What if 
doctors implant the fertilized egg of one woman into the womb of another? 
What if the couple decides to use a known sperm donor rather than an 
anonymous one? What if he is the biological relative of the non-inseminated 
partner and therefore the non-inseminating mother has some genetic link to 
the child? What if the couple wants the donor to have an ongoing relationship 
with the child; does he then have to be a recognized parent? What if they 
would like him to be a legal father? And finally, what if, as seems to be 
making Student B so very apprehensive, they really do plan to have two legal 
fathers and two legal mothers for their not-yet-conceived child? 
Many of these questions have pretty definitive answers, though ones that 
                                                 
111 The American Law Institute recognizes parentage by estoppel or in effect ALI 
PRINCIPLES § 203(1)(c); see more generally, Lea Moalemi, Blood Will Not Justify My 
Relation: Same-Sex Couples and their Battle for Standing as De Facto Parents, 56 FAM. CT. 
REV. 490 (2018); Susan E. Oram, De Facto Parental Rights: A View from the Trenches, 23 
ME. B.J. 150 (2008).  
112 See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); see generally, Jane S. 
Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent 
Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933 (2000). 
113 A minority but growing number of states now routinely list married same-sex partners 
as parents on the birth certificate of a child born to the marriage, thus obviating the need for 
a second-parent adoption (although even in those states non-biological parents are sometimes 
advised to nonetheless complete an adoption as additional protection against any dispute). 
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 
1240-49 (2016). 
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may vary significantly from state to state.114 Our student-lawyers must 
research to find out what those answers are. In doing so they will teach 
themselves quite a significant body of family law. And since there might 
always be the possibility the family could relocate, they should have at least 
a rough notion of how those responses might be different in other states. In 
other words, they have to fully learn the existing legal rules. 
With respect to the final question, though, which our vignette indicates is 
not just a moot hypothetical but instead a real possibility their client is raising, 
the students-lawyers are probably going to find that the question is a new one 
and the law at present provides no conclusive precedent.115 The best they can 
hope to do is to interpret—to imaginatively yet critically extend—the existing 
rules of law in an effort to try to predict how it might be applied to the alluded 
four-parent scenario.  
Interpretative work in law often starts from analogical thinking.116 If two 
circumstances are similar, then the same rule of law ought to govern both.117 
This, though, begs the question what makes different situations sufficiently 
“similar.”  
Our student-lawyers might start by asking whether there are any cases 
already recognizing more than two legal parents. If they tried that avenue they 
would probably soon discover that advocacy on behalf of stepparents has 
resulted in a number of cases of their being granted status in loco parentis118 
even without termination of the parenting rights and obligations of one of the 
original legally-sanctioned parents.119 These cases somewhat acknowledge 
the possibility of a family having three adults functioning as parents due to 
the exigencies of remarriage. Student-lawyers might also encounter opinions 
permitting a reduction from two-parent families to one where warranted by 
the facts, despite statutes designed to perpetuate continuation of at least two 
                                                 
114 See id. at 1140-65. 
115 At the time of this writing they are going to find just a very few cases, none of which 
establish unequivocal precedent. Probably the most closely-related circumstances arise in a 
New York case determining that a third parent had standing to seek custody and visitation of 
the child he had been raising with his husband (the child’s biological and legal father) and 
their friend 9the child’s biological and legal mother). Raymond T. v. Samantha G., 74 
N.Y.S.3d 730 (Fam. Ct. 2018). But their research should also show that so far that case 
remains an outlier, and has not persuaded other jurisdictions. 
116 Schott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational 
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996).  
117 Id. at 931-34. 
118 Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to their Stepchildren, 
40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 100-102 (2006). 
119 A termination of the parenting rights of an original parent is ordinarily required for a 
stepparent adoption, usually upon consent of the terminating parent, but occasionally over 
his or her objection (e.g., In the matter of J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986)). 
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legal parents.120 Or they’ll locate other decisions restricting the expansion of 
parenting rights in new family formations to ones that can be seen as “the 
functional equivalent of the traditional husband-wife relationship.”121 Are 
these circumstances “similar” to Frankie’s and Saanvi’s potential four-parent 
family? Unclear, but it does highlight why in the vignette our student-lawyers 
are rightly interested in finding out whether the proposed dads are married. 
The stepparent rules may end up being analogized in some argument favoring 
legal status for all four parents. 
Using what they learn about the history of recognizing parentage in 
assisted reproductive technology cases, or for stepparents, the team of 
student-lawyers might try to interpret those rules by reasoning deductively122 
(working from the general to the particular) or inductively123 (working from 
the particular to the general).  In addition, Frankie’s attorneys might also want 
to consider the policy basis for the rules in interpreting whether existing law 
might somehow reach to cover a family with two mothers and two fathers.124 
An understanding of the reasons for what the law currently is helps predict 
what it might become under the new circumstances. 
Our student-lawyers absolutely must engage in this interpretation of legal 
rules in order to answer their client’s question. Yet even they already 
understand that in such novel circumstances it is extraordinarily unlikely they 
will ever produce an unambiguous answer. It is almost undoubtedly true that 
no amount of reading, research or thoughtful interpretation of the law will 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., In re: Z.E., 21019 WL 3779711 (Pa. Super Ct. 2019) (not reported) (against 
strict interpretation of adoption statute, the court permitted termination of a biological 
father’s paternity absent the usually-required averment of intended adoption by new father, 
due to the horrific circumstances of the children having been conceived as the product of  
decades-long rape of the mother and a possible ongoing threat of abuse to the children even 
with the incarceration of the biological father). 
121 Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (denying paternal 
adoption of a child by the brother of the biological/legal mother). 
122 The beginning point in articulating the process of deduction is often attributed to 
Aristotle (with perhaps an updated nod to Sherlock Holmes), and is taught in nearly all 
philosophy courses specializing in logic. See also JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK, 79-90 
(1991). Introductory legal writing/legal analysis textbooks commonly explain processes of 
deductive reasoning in some detail in order to show beginning law students how they will be 
expected to reason. For just one such sample, see BRETT A. BROSSEIT, ELIZABETH M. 
MORTENSON & SARAH D. MURPHY, APPLIED CRITICAL THINKING & LEGAL ANALYSIS: 
PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION FOR LAW STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONALS, 139-41 (2017). 
123 Again, frequently attributed to Aristotle. For an in-depth examination of basic 
principles of induction see IRVING M. COPI, CARL COHEN & VICTOR RODYCH, 
INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC, 495-599 (15th ed., 2019); see also APPLIED CRITICAL THINKING, 
id. at 133-35 (summarizing induction for a law student audience). 
124 Policy arguments are grounded in normative claims about what is a public good. See 
MICHAEL EVAN GOLD, A PRIMER ON LEGAL REASONING, 122-37 (2018); WILSON HUHN, 
THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT, 51-53 (2002). 
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fully conclude the investigation. In the absence of square precedent from 
within their exact jurisdiction which specifically recognizes a four-parent 
family comprised of two same-sex couples with two members who are the 
biological progenitors of the child, our student-lawyers will probably not be 
able to provide a conclusive answer to their client about the legal status of 
such a family. That precedent certainly does not exist at the moment.  
Even suppose it did. Depending on the client’s determination and the 
advocate’s creativity, it is still precisely in the nature of lawyers to look for 
ways to compare or distinguish such precedent to argue that it should or 
should not determine Frankie and Saanvi’s case. The only thing that could 
unquestionably settle the law for Frankie and Saanvi would be a final 
statement of the law in their specific case by a judge deciding it. That in turn 
would prompt subsequent refinement of the rules when some relatedly- but 
differently- constituted families argue that the (hypothetical future) 
Frankie/Saanvi case did or did not apply to them. Thus illustrating the almost-
endless cycle of interpreting rules of law. Also exemplifying why the 
processes of interpreting law and fact are inextricably interwoven. 
But our student-lawyers must assist their client now. They have to help 
decide in the absence of well-settled precedent whether they want to take the 
legal risks associated with building a four-parent family. Facts and rules may 
be ever-entangled in law, but as is so commonly true, here the rules will affect 
the facts we have to work with because they may end up determining how 
our client sets about trying to bring a child into her family in the first place. 
The lawyers’ interpretation of the rules will influence Frankie’s 
understanding of how much legal risk would be involved in a currently-
untested family formation, which in turn could have a direct consequences 
on how Frankie ultimately constructs her family. 
 
B.  Professors/Case Supervisors: Using Well-Chosen Factual Settings to 
Stimulate Interpretation of Legal Rules 
Given the enterprise of this Article, this section could proceed in several 
directions. We might ask: how do we navigate and interpret the rules of legal 
education? Or alternatively: what is the role of interpreting rules in legal 
education?  
The enquiries do not truly diverge, however. It could be fairly said that 
virtually all aims of legal education and its pedagogy are concerned with 
imparting both the substance of a common body of legal rules and the ability 
to use them professionally. Most of the unresolved disputes in law teaching 
stem from differing emphases on those proficiencies or on differing ideas 
about how to impart them, not from disagreement that both matter. So this 
project takes as given that institutions of legal education care about students 
learning bodies of substantive law and skills in interpreting and using it.  
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Assuming that’s true, the “rules”125 structuring law school courses tend 
to require classes to straddle some middle ground between introducing the 
specific common law principles and statutes that govern the topic we teach, 
and probing more deeply into the meaning of the discipline or of the workings 
of law itself. No one law school course can ever teach all of the rules of law 
there are to know on a particular legal topic. Even if it could the law would 
keep changing and evolving; its practitioners must be adept at interpreting 
the extant rules and applying them to new situations. Thus the common law 
professors’ debate about topical “coverage” in their courses126 misses the 
point. A pretty indisputable rule about law classes, then, is that we cannot 
ever possibly cover everything.127 
One thing every course can reasonably aim to do, though, is to ensure 
students are given the opportunity to deeply encounter the core concepts of 
its subject. Educational theorists Aaron Pallas and Anna Neumann define 
core concepts as those “basic building blocks” that depict “a field’s unique 
substantive concerns and distinctive knowledge structures and dynamics.”128 
In other words, they form a base from which further meaningful inquiry into 
the subject could, and would have to, spring. Think “supply and demand” in 
economics, for example.129 Understanding that notion—really understanding 
it—is foundational to learning pretty much anything else in the field.  
It is important to distinguish “core concepts” from the “topics” typically 
covered in a particular subject. First of all, there are probably fewer of them. 
Maybe at most three or four. Maybe only one. The core concepts will be those 
ideas or processes which by their very nature provide a gateway to learning 
all of the topics that the subject matter can muster. For lawyers, the core 
                                                 
125 Here, “norms” might be a more accurate descriptor, if we see that designation as 
encompassing both behaviors that are required and those that are only customary and 
expected. Both norms and rules can function similarly to control conduct, though of course 
the consequences for violating them might be very different. Indeed, some earlier versions 
of the Lawyer Method Elements did reference “norms” as a category and include legal rules 
as a subset within that umbrella. (Unpublished manuscripts on file with the author). But the 
familiarity and clarity of referencing “rules” has its appeal as well—even if at times those 
“rules” are more metaphorical than mandatory. 
126 For a few examples of legal educators’ skepticism regarding concerns about coverage 
justifying resistance to new teaching methodologies, see Steven I. Friedland, Trumpeting 
Change: Replacing Tradition with Engaged Legal Education, 3 Elon L. REV. 93, 125-26 
(2011); Robert F. Blomquist, Some Thoughts on Law School Curriculum Reform: Scaling 
the Mountainside, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 641, 656-57 (1995). 
127 Another corresponding rule is that we are probably never really finished teaching 
anything. It is unrealistic to assume that one class or one year is enough time to fully master 
the intricate nuances of lawyers’ thinking, for example, so teachers of upper-level law classes 
are probably remiss if they do not include teaching legal analysis as one objective of their 
course.  
128 CONVERGENT TEACHING, supra note ___ at 67. 
129 Id. at 68. 
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concepts of our subject matter almost always boil down to the law’s ways of 
addressing weighty social matters like “punishment” in criminal law, or 
perhaps “responsibility” in torts. If our students struggle to understand that 
this is what the body of law they are learning is about, they may study an 
array of legal rules but will be ill-equipped to truly and deeply know those 
rules, or to actually use them. Law teachers would be well advised to think 
clearly about what core concepts they want to get across in their subjects, and 
to concentrate on and return to those core concepts until their students move 
toward mastery. Then we must enable students to bring those concepts to the 
many topics the subjects typically include.  
So what are the core concepts in family law?  
Like almost anything in law, that could probably be debated endlessly. 
But I believe it would not be too controversial to suggest that one core 
concept is what makes someone the parent of a child with all of the ensuing 
legal privileges and responsibilities that status grants. Many potentially-
conflicting factors might dispose of that question: genetics,130 intention,131 or 
perhaps habit, or function.132 These factors may historically have been hard 
to disaggregate, because they usually converge when a fertile heterosexual 
couple conceives by ordinary means. But parentage gets more complicated 
and more interesting, when those factors are not in exact alignment. Thus the 
bulk of parentage law in most family law courses arises in contexts where the 
factors conflict, forcing courts or legislators to establish hierarchies among 
the considerations. Decisions about which factors matter most may change 
                                                 
130 It is sometimes important legally to distinguish genetics from biology, because they 
may not always correspond. In cases of gestational surrogacy the woman who biologically 
gives birth to a child may not have any genetic connection to the infant, and may not be the 
child’s legal parent. See Mark Strasser, The Updating of Baby M: A Confused Jurisprudence 
Becomes More Confusing, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 181,183, 194-201 (2016). Conversely, in 
donor egg insemination, a woman who gives birth to a child may have no genetic relationship 
yet be both the intended and legal parent of a child she gave birth to. See NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 
802-804, 809, 815 (2017) [hereinafter UPA]. 
131 UPA, id. §703 (relying on “intent to be a parent” for legal parentage in assisted 
reproduction cases). The state of California even provides statutory forms giving lawful 
effect to stated intentions of parenting in assisted reproduction cases. CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7613.5. The student-lawyers should also note, though, that the UPA remains model 
legislation that has not been widely adopted, and that California law is considered to be a 
leader in the area of intentional parenting, and even that state does not permit intention to 
supersede genetics in all instances. See Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a sperm donor was not precluded from asserting presumed 
biological parentage). 
132 That is, by acting as a de facto parent. See UPA § 609, id.  For a mapping of de facto 
parentage laws in different U.S. jurisdictions see 
https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-parents-de-facto.pdf.  
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over time, and they can be diametrically opposite in different jurisdictions.133 
Learning this teaches burgeoning family lawyers that all of the considerations 
matter to some extent, and there is no easy consensus about how to resolve 
difficult questions about such a profoundly important question as “Who is a 
parent?” 
Does it go without saying that our vignette shows the student-lawyers 
preparing to grapple with precisely that question? And that they seem already 
to have a sense of the immense importance of the answer for their client and 
her potential future child?  
In a similar vein, the earlier vignette in Part I included student-lawyers 
contending with what most family law scholars would identify as another 
core concept in the subject matter: what is the legal, cultural and personal 
significance of marriage? Here is where the framing of the facts and 
characters as written by Davis and Davenport shows a particular genius. By 
presenting student-lawyers with a client who is trying to decide whether to 
get married at all, the students have to consider carefully the distinction 
between personal relationship decisions and the benefits and obligations 
conferred by the state within the legal institution of marriage. They have to 
ask themselves why marriage is a function of government at all, rather than 
purely a private commitment. Perhaps they will begin to interrogate the line 
demarking personal autonomous choice in family formation and what is, or 
should be, part of the public purview.134 
This is a significant departure from the approach Susan Apel took in her 
visionary family law simulation course. There, an already-married client’s 
presenting issue was a divorce.135 By tracing the typical stages of the divorce, 
Apel’s students move through the topics commonly taught in family law 
casebook classes: rules governing child support, division of marital property, 
spousal support obligations, and so forth.136 Apel beautifully demonstrates 
that with thoughtful manipulation of character and fact, doctrinal “coverage” 
is just as easy (or difficult) to achieve in an immersion course as it is in a 
more traditional one.137 In fact, I did just that for my own immersion course. 
                                                 
133 E.g., with respect to functional parenting laws, compare Chatterjee v. King, 280 P. 
3d 283 (N.M. 2012) with McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), app. 
den., 546 N.W.2d 256 (Mich. 1996). 
134 Which might further spur the more philosophically-minded among them to wonder 
whether that question more fundamentally lies under virtually all of the great unresolvable 
questions in law.  
135 No More Casebooks, supra note ___ at 701. 
136 Id. at 703. 
137 Though not without allowing for some convenient artificialities. For example in my 
Family Law and Practice class students draft a prenuptial contract which sadly never gets 
signed, so that when Frankie and Saanvi later get divorced my students will have to employ 
state regulations to resolve how their property will be divided.  
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As I was creating my version I scanned the contents of just about all of the 
family law casebooks on the market, selected the topics that seemed common 
among them and also struck me as particularly important, and then modified 
Davis and Davenport’s narratives so the progress of the clients’ cases would 
naturally raise each one. It wasn’t especially hard to do. 
But the innovation that Davis and Davenport’s scenario brings is a more 
critical and fundamental investigation into the legal institution of marriage. 
To answer some of Frankie’s questions in the first vignette, the student-
lawyers had to think deeply about the very meaning of marriage in law and 
society. This consequently allows the class to bring in some of the larger 
constitutional questions about family autonomy and the role of the state. 138 
Addressing these core questions experientially, with the explicit goal of 
helping their own client think them through, enriches the students’ 
understanding of marriage itself. That should in turn strengthen their mastery 
and retention of the many legal rules pertaining to marriage law that they will 
learn along the way.  
Likewise, by asking themselves whether existing parenting laws can be 
interpreted to permit a two-mother-two-father family, our student lawyers 
will simultaneously develop a deeper understanding of what the law does 
currently establish.139 
I would posit that the Davis/Davenport scenario is simply one excellent 
example of the kind of fictional universe that by its very design requires deep 
engagement with core concepts in its subject matter. Further, that scenarios 
engaging identified core concepts could be created for virtually any subject 
in law. And finally, that having that engagement be an essential outgrowth of 
their client work enables students to survey the legal rules of the subject while 
at the same time reinforcing their learning about lawyers’ interpretive 
processes, which can always be further developed.  
 
IV. MANAGING INTERACTIONS 
Student A: Gosh, it’s so sad to work on a divorce. I 
suppose I am not the only one relieved when it seems, like 
it does for Saanvi,140 the couple hopes to treat each other 
                                                 
138 For example in addition to the obviously directly-relevant Obergefell decision, 
students read and consider Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
139 With a concomitant investigation of the big-picture constitutional background in 
cases like Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Michael H. v. Gerald D. 504 U.S. 
905 (1988). 
140  In defiance of professional responsibility rules (and basic ethics) students who have 
thus far represented Frankie now switch to working with Saanvi in the marital dissolution 
section of the course. This serves the purpose of introducing a different client’s perspective 
without having to take time for the class to learn a new family’s facts. Though we generally 
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respectfully. Those angry scorched-earth breakups are 
terrible for the couple and I imagine they take a lot out of 
the attorneys, too. 
Student B: I guess so. But my impression is some 
lawyers like that. Maybe even encourage it. 
Student C: Well we’re certainly not going to do that. Yet 
I don’t think that’s a guarantee that everything this divorce 
is, and will, remain amicable. I mean… 
Student B: [interrupting]… That’s right. No matter how 
pragmatically people want to approach it, breakups involve 
hurt feelings and can turn messier than anyone ever 
expected. 
Student A: Plus when there are kids involved, like 
Saanvi’s daughter here, the two can have a lot more conflict 
than they would if they were just dividing up property.   
Student C: Yeah, and the stakes for trying to behave 
cooperatively are even higher. Zelda is still a toddler, 
which means Saanvi will be actively co-parenting with her 
ex for at least another decade and a half. Probably more. 
Student A: So do you think Saanvi’s hope for primary 
custody is realistic? It seems like Frankie has actually spent 
more time with Zelda so far, and I’m guessing Frankie’s 
lawyers will fight that. I’m worried, too, that us pushing for 
that will make it harder to get a favorable economic 
settlement for our client. There are only so many things at 
issue to negotiate. 
Student B: Hold on a minute! I know you probably 
didn’t mean to suggest it, but to me there’s something 
super-uncomfortable about the idea that we might trade 
time with the kid for money in a divorce. 
Student A: Of course that’s not what I meant! 
Although… [spoken more tentatively] um, isn’t that sort of 
what sometimes happens in a divorce settlement? We have 
to do a good job representing Saanvi’s interests in every 
area we negotiate. And sometimes matters in a negotiation 
end up connected.  
                                                 
strive where possible for verisimilitude, there are certainly times when we use the advantages 
of artificiality to facilitate immersion learning. 
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Student C: Ok. We have got our work cut out for us 
prepping for our settlement conference with Frankie’s 
lawyers. 
 
A.  Students/Lawyers: Treating Interactive Work as a Challenging and 
Vital Part of their Profession 
This vignette leaps ahead in time. Frankie and Saanvi have legally wed 
(alas without ever having signed a prenuptial agreement even though my 
students drafted one!) and have been raising their141 child together. Our 
student-lawyers now represent Saanvi, and the couple is currently 
contemplating divorce. Our student-lawyers are doing well to carefully 
contrast what their client has thus far presented with what can typically 
happen in the difficult circumstances of dissolving a long-term relationship, 
especially one where child custody may be contested. 
They know what she asked them to do—behave reasonably and fairly 
toward Frankie while settling the asset division and seeking exclusive or 
primary custody of Zelda—and they suspect she may be unrealistic in failing 
to realize those objectives may conflict. The lawyers appear appropriately 
concerned, and they are committed to exploring the tensions these interests 
may pose.  
As her advocates, they probably should be.  
Divorce cases are some of the most emotionally-laden and important 
settings most family lawyers work in.142 The complexity of the work in my 
class is amplified by the fact that the divorce takes place in New York. The 
state retains fault-based causes of action in divorce proceedings, and was the 
last in the US to freely sanction divorces without allegation of wrongdoing.143 
If the divorce were litigated, allegations and proof of fault by one party could 
potentially affect not just the grounds for terminating the legal marriage144 
                                                 
141 The child is legally theirs alone. In the facts the student-lawyers are given, one 
member of the male couple who considered parenthood with our protagonists did end up 
donating sperm, but neither he nor his partner considers himself the child’s father. While the 
men spend some time with Zelda, neither has ended up having a genuine parenting role in 
her life.    
142 Examining the body of family law more generally, but providing a perfect 
encapsulation of the stereotyped divorce action, Clare Huntington observes  that “in its 
dispute-resolution mode, law intervenes in a heavy-handed and adversarial fashion, often 
exacerbating family conflicts by pitting one family member against another in a zero-sum, 
win-lose battle.” CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, at xii (2014). 
143 NY Dom. Rel. L. § 170.7, permitting divorce on the grounds that a marriage has 
broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, was adopted in 2010. 
144 In New York these consist of abandonment, cruel and inhuman treatment, extended 
imprisonment, adultery, or judgment following a legally ordered or privately agreed-upon 
separation. See NY Dom. Rel. L. §§ 170.1-170.6. 
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but the terms of post-nuptial economic arrangements.145 Perhaps it could even 
impact custody or visitation.146 
To be effective advocates for Saanvi our student-lawyers are going to 
have to ask some very sensitive questions. They will naturally have to probe 
into some personal areas of her relationship that Saanvi may—but far more 
likely may not—feel comfortable talking about.147 They may have to help her 
sort through which feelings are important but not necessarily legally 
significant (“I just can’t believe she said that to me!”) and which might be 
material to her case. Meanwhile, anyone facing the prospect of divorce is 
likely to be distressed, anxious about the future, and perhaps defensive and 
eager to protect the memory of positive parts of the relationship, or 
conversely, to reject the possibility of anything positive about the past or the 
future.  
While preparing for what will ideally be a settlement in their case, the 
student-lawyers will constantly have to manage their interpersonal 
communications with Saanvi. 148  They will have to establish her overall 
objectives, help her sort her priorities, and counsel her to compare those 
desires against what would be realistically achievable in litigation. Next they 
will have to get ready to advocate for her with opposing counsel, and 
eventually in court if the parties are unable agree on a private dissolution. In 
other words, every phase of their work will require effective interpersonal 
interactions, rather with their client, another advocate, or possibly eventually 
a judge hearing the case.  
Clinical professors in law have probably always paid attention to the 
interpersonal dimensions of lawyering.149 A wider range of legal scholars 
began to catch up to the importance of the human aspects of law with the 
                                                 
145 For one court’s extended and thoughtful examination of ways marital fault may relate 
to post-nuptial property allocation and spousal support, see Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70 (2005). 
146 Courts do strive to treat interpersonal difficulties between spouses as quite distinct 
from the parties’ roles as parents. But it is also easy to see how facts establishing at least 
some legal grounds for divorce (for example cruelty or abandonment) could also bleed into 
the court’s assessment of a child’s best interests. 
147 For example, does anyone feel truly at ease when asking adult in a professional 
context for details about her sexual compatibility with her partner? Lawyers can (must?) 
learn techniques for asking uncomfortable questions of their clients. But that probably does 
not make it easy even for highly-experience practitioners, let alone the budding attorneys 
who are actually managing Saanvi’s case. 
148 See Mary Pat Treuthart, A Perspective on Teaching and Learning Family Law, 75 
UMKC L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (2007) (describing her own work as a family law practitioner 
and observing that “even when the legal aspects were… routine” her interactions with clients 
made it invigorating). 
149 Brook K. Baker, Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participation in the 
Interpersonal Ecology of Practice, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1999). 
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emergence in the 1990s of a field explicitly studying law and emotion.150 But 
this is not to suggest that managing interpersonal interactions is limited to 
handling people’s feelings. Instead it goes to the core of what it means to 
represent clients.151 The Lawyering Method explains that as a central 
component of their work, attorneys “communicate with clients, 
counterparties, witnesses, and various kinds of decisionmakers.”152 This 
inevitably requires “managing each interaction strategically to further 
institutional or client goals without being wrongfully deceptive or 
inappropriately manipulative.”153 
Because our student-lawyers will ultimately need to advocate on their 
client’s behalf, they know that had better take care to listen to her carefully 
now. They stand in between their client and the person who will decide 
something incredibly important in her life, so their job is not just to 
understand and care about her goal of getting her son home, but to anticipate 
how they can put her in the most favorable position with the deciding body. 
Thus the attorneys must find ways now to counsel their client (which often 
takes the form of questioning their client or even disagreeing with her154) all 
while earning and retaining her trust. And they must do so while keeping in 
mind what they believe will eventually be the most effective way of 
persuasively interacting with agency officials or a judge.  
Notice how inextricably the interpersonal is entwined with the facts and 
the law.155 The student-lawyers in our vignette understand that what they 
                                                 
150 See THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). For additional current 
resources on law and emotion see Robin West, Law’s Emotions, 19 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 
339 (2016); Carleton J. Patrick, A New Synthesis for Law and Emotions: Insights from the 
Behavioral Sciences, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1239 (2105). 
151 Grant H. Morris believes that confronting the emotional issues lawyers deal with in 
the practice of law is “an essential part of practical skills and professional identity 
development” for law students. Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the Educational 
Experience of First-Year Law, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465474 (2010). 
152 Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29418. 
153 Id. 
154 “I believe lawyers should give advice, sometimes forcefully…” Abbe Smith, “I Ain’t 
Takin’ No Plea”: The Challenges in Counseling Young People Facing Serious Time, 60 
RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 16 (2007). Some scholars might find that directedness antithetical to 
the “client-centered” lawyering introduced in 1977 by David Binder & Susan Price in their 
influential text Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach. But so 
long as clients remain the determiners of their own circumstances, at least some 
commentators suggest that dialogue between lawyers and clients, even if challenging, is not 
inconsistent with client-centeredness or with good lawyering practice. See Robert Dinerstein, 
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 581-93 
(1990). 
155 Some would argue that the interpersonal is uniquely important in family law. For an 
example of the contention that factual and personal context are particularly heavily 
implicated in family law, see Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 NOTRE 
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learn about the facts of Saanvi’s case will determine what they can interpret 
and argue to be her legal rights. Which will correspondingly affect what they 
advise her to agree to and to challenge. Which then establishes how she 
authorizes her attorneys to advocate on her behalf. Which sets the parameters 
for their arguments and negotiation in her case. And all of this must take into 
account the lens through which a judge or other authority may perceive her 
case. All of it depends meaningfully on interactive dynamics.   
Managing interactions is sophisticated and challenging work. Our law 
student-lawyers are only beginning to be introduced to it,156 and they will 
probably have to devote many years of their careers to developing real 
interactive expertise. But immersion learning immediately and automatically 
places these crucial professional skills on the table. It shows beginners who 
spend so much of their time in law school absorbing rules and reasoning that 
legal doctrine will become only one component of what Eli Wald and Russell 
Pearce accurately describe as the immensely relational work of representing 
clients.157 
B.  Professors/Case Supervisors: Managing Faculty Interactions to 
Foster Integrated Teaching and Learning 
From the professors’ perspective, managing interactions in an immersion 
class is one of the true delights of teaching it. It is also one of the most 
complex and demanding requirements of this kind of pedagogy.158 
Of course, professors interact with students in every class and on every 
day. We generally believe it is up to us to guide that discourse successfully 
                                                 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 28, 316-17 (2018); but see also Kathryn Abrams, Barriers 
and Boundaries: Exploring Emotion in the Law of the Family, 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & Law 
301, 307 (2008) (asserting that at least at the time of writing the law and emotions scholarship 
focused on the family was underdeveloped). 
156 Though it may well be true that law schools ought to pay far greater attention to 
teaching this, and much earlier on. Joshua D. Rosenberg, Teaching Empathy in Law School, 
36 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 621, 631 (2002). 
157 Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law 
Practice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601 (2016). The phrase “relational lawyering” was 
perhaps introduced in the early 1990s or before (see Serena Steir, Reframing Legal Skills: 
Relational Lawyering, 42 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 303, 303 (1992) (introducing the concept in a 
review of two recently-published works on client counseling). It has gained significant 
traction and is now in fairly common use. See, e.g., Susan L. Brooks, Mindful Engagement 
and Relational Lawyering, 48 SW L. REV. 267 (2019)/ 
158 Clinical law professors have developed almost a science of supervision to guide their 
practices when overseeing student lawyering work. See CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note 
___ at 169-252. All law teachers who expect to simulate law practice experiences can learn 
a tremendous amount from this scholarship. But because we deal with matters which, in the 
end, do not really resolve events in actual peoples’ lives, immersion teachers may also be 
able to get away with being slightly less ambitiously deliberate in their supervisory rules. 
That may be a fair tradeoff for such a multi-dimensional teaching and learning modality. 
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in our own classrooms,159 so we may already treat the “managing” part of the 
interaction as a component of our teaching. Yet that work is geometrically 
more complicated when students are immersed in real-feeling client 
representation. 
It may be useful to disaggregate “managing” from “interactions.” First 
let’s observe just how many distinct interactions there are. Our vignette 
suggests the student-lawyers have already met with their new client, so that’s 
one. They will probably end up negotiating with opposing counsel or perhaps 
mediating a settlement. That’s at least another, maybe more. They may end 
up arguing their client’s case in front of a judge. If so, given the facts as we 
know them, we can expect they will need to prepare their client for the 
proceeding. Plus the student-lawyers are managing their own collaboration. 
In all our vignettes they seem to be doing a pretty good job of advantageously 
using their different reactions to the clients, rather than allowing variances to 
hamper their teamwork.160 Are we up to five or six interactions just for this 
one snippet of one case in the course? There’s plenty to keep adding: 
throughout a semester in my Family Law in Practice class students will 
interact with a taxation consultant, an expert on child protective proceedings, 
multiple supervisors, at least three different clients, a child welfare worker, a 
mediator, and one another as opposing counsel.161 
In short, the work in the immersion course requires a rather a lot of 
interacting. Far more than takes place in a typical casebook-driven course. 
This then begs the question: is it the immersion instructor’s job to manage all 
of these relations?  
Depends on what we mean by “manage.” It is revealing that the Mirriam-
Webster definition for the verb indicates that it can be used either transitively 
or intransitively.162 The intransitive version of “to manage” means “to direct 
or carry on business.”163 Intransitive verbs do not allow for direct objects, so 
                                                 
159 See generally MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, GERALD F. HESS & SOPHIE M. 
SCHWARTZ, WHAT THE BEST LAW TEACHERS DO, 177-85; 241-58 (2013) (detailing the 
control yet flexibility with which master law teachers expect to run their classrooms). 
160 Let’s be honest about the fact that productive cooperation will probably not always 
happen, in which case addressing any tensions within teams is yet another set of interactions 
the students, the professor, or both, will have to manage. 
161 For my own classes I find it enjoyable to play any of these roles myself, but I usually 
don’t have to. Colleagues from both within my institution and outside of it have been eager 
to volunteer to come to class and play one of these roles. The variety of differing styles in 
interaction is immensely valuable to my students, and having guests play the roles affords 
me the opportunity to act as an intermediary, or sort of MC for some of my own classes. [The 
very fact that so many busy professionals are keen to play these roles may also say something 
about a hunger for new forms of teaching in the legal academy.] 
162 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (online ed.), available at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/manage. 
163 Id. 
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in this meaning of the word the action itself is all. The person managing is 
the person doing. But the dictionary lists the transitive form of the verb first: 
“to handle or direct with a degree of skills.”164 Thus in this more primary 
sense of the term, the person managing is the person facilitating, 
coordinating, or maybe overseeing the processes others are involved in. The 
definitional distinction here provides a neat metaphor for the kinds of 
“managing interactions” that the best immersion teachers probably do. We 
create opportunities for student-lawyers to learn in role. 
It is precisely that learning in role which so gloriously interleaves 
interactive, analytical and problem-solving skills for law students and novice 
practitioners. The interpersonal dimension cannot be devalued when it is an 
indispensable part of doing the work at hand.165 Substantial research supports 
a conclusion that working in role enhances student learning and retention.166 
So the very process of managing the myriad interactions our student-lawyers 
have to participate in and anticipate can help them master the material they 
are learning. At the same time it necessarily improves their experience and 
proficiency at interviewing and counseling their client, or persuading 
someone on her behalf. 
On the faculty side, meanwhile, we probably have a meta- set of 
interactions we will need to attend to. How do professors committed to 
immersive teaching interact with those in the academy who may not value 
it?167 Or with law school administrators who may have concerns about 
resource allocation, particularly at the outset in the development phase of a 
new model of instruction?  
To the first point, it is probably true that very few colleagues will directly 
confront an eager immersion instructor to dispute the value of such a course. 
                                                 
164 Id. 
165 Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, 
and the Importance, of Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1225 (2004). 
166 See Danial Druckman & Noam Ebner, Onstage or Behind the Scenes? Relative 
Learning Benefits of Simulation Role-Play and Design, 39 SIMULATION & GAMING 465 
(2008) (summarizing the literature showing benefits of role-based learning); see also Nellie 
Munin & Yael Efron, Role-Playing Brings Theory to Life in a Multicultural Learning 
Environment, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 309 (2017); Nadja Alexander & Michelle LeBaron, DEATH 
OF ROLE-PLAY, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 459 (2010) (which despite its title looks 
favorably upon in-role learning). For background thinking about the place of drama and in-
role work in learning see AUGUSTO BOAL, GAMES FOR ACTORS AND NON-ACTORS (2d ed. 
2002).  
167 To the extent that, at least in the 1990s, Leonard D. Pertnoy felt the need to remind 
the legal academy that it was actually fine to teach legal skills to law students. Skills is Not 
a Dirty Word, 59 MO. L. REV. 169 (1994); cf. Jonathan K. Van Patten, Skills for Law 
Students, 61 S.D. L. REV. 165, 195-200 (2016) (concluding that legal education does provide 
skills valuable in the practice of law). 
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Quite the opposite; many law professors purport to favor such a turn toward 
more integrated learning in law schools. Yet—we do not ever seem to really 
change to get there.168  
Managing our professional interactions to generate enthusiasm for 
meaningful (but manageable) reform is an important part of moving broadly 
toward a more contextualized and immersive pedagogy.169 Those who want 
to see such changes have to make difficult choices about whether we want to 
just do it ourselves in our own classes, or whether we seek more ambitiously 
to bring others along with us. In the case of the former, we need only to find 
ways to steer through an institutional curriculum approval process. For the 
latter, though, we need broad coalition-building and probably a willingness 
to collaborate and compromise.  
We need to think about who is most willing and able to change their 
model of law teaching: Younger faculty who may have less investment in 
traditional modes of instruction (or in the lecture notes they may have honed 
over the course of a career), but who may also be focused on tenure or more 
generally on garnering recognition within their fields? Mid-career or more 
senior faculty members who are ready for something new, but whose time 
can be limited by the fact that they often bear the bulk of faculty governance 
and institutional service in addition to being more sought-after for their 
scholarly expertise? Should it be clinical faculty members, doctrinal teachers, 
or professors of legal research and writing? Immersive teaching interrelates 
aspects of all of these fields, and can thus be done by any. But there are likely 
to be relational implications depending upon who leads the charge.170 
Prospective immersion teachers will also have to be strategic in managing 
their interactions with the people who hold the purse strings. Immersion 
                                                 
168 See Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’ 
Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Competencies 
Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105 (2010). I do not actually agree 
with the author’s conclusions that law faculty are obsessed with scholarship, or that 
scholarship is necessarily in contention with practical education. But I entirely endorse the 
notion that the legal academy tends to talk about changes in the ways we educate lawyers far 
more than we actually change. 
169 As an instructive example, Prof. Newton’s thoughtful critique offers insights that 
legal education reformers might find genuinely valuable, but… I am hard-pressed to believe 
most law professors would embrace being guided by a work that refers to their scholarly 
endeavors as providing “little if any social utility” and represent “a colossal amount of 
wasted resources.” Id. at 114. 
170 One could argue that at least some programs traditionally thought to fall within the 
LRW rubric but in fact emphasizing a far broader range of lawyering skills and 
competencies, are already paving the way. Yet even law schools that enthusiastically 
incorporate this immersive professional practice teaching in their curriculum have mostly 
limited the methodology to the programs themselves, rather than seeing them as a model for 
more widespread curricular innovation. 
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courses do require resources which casebook courses simply do not routinely 
need. But one thing we lawyers know is that managing interactions 
persuasively often means aligning the relief sought with the interests of those 
with the power to decide in our favor. Perhaps it can be helpful, then, to 
remind deans and faculty who are on the fence about committing time and 
money to immersion projects about all those judges, alumni, and other critics 
of legal education who keep saying that law schools can, indeed must, do a 
much better job of preparing our students of the future to become lawyers.171   
 
V. IMMERSION METHODOLOGY AND LEGAL ED REFORM 
Teaching by Experiential Immersion Draws Significantly from the Work 
of Clinical Legal Education. 
Is teaching by immersion simply another way of talking about clinical 
teaching? Because it can be adopted with a primary purpose of teaching legal 
doctrine, I don’t think so. But because it is driven by a client-based problem-
solving approach, and so deeply enmeshes learning rules and skills in a 
relational setting, it certainly shares a great deals with clinical methodology.  
Legal scholars can and have quibbled about how exactly to describe 
clinical methods.172 Yet I do not think it is much of a leap to suggest that 
decades of work exploring clinical methods173 and simulation in law teaching 
have arrived at some basic agreements about what they consists of. I concur 
with Carolyn Grose’s sense that there exists at least a “loose consensus” 
regarding what constitutes clinical/experiential pedagogy.174 And although 
clinical methodology may not be fully congruent with immersion teaching, it 
is entirely consistent with it.175 
                                                 
171 Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 281 (2018) (considering the problem of teaching law “universally,” and arguing 
for a wholesale commitment to context in the law school curriculum). It may be encouraging 
that Sheldon Krantz and Michael Millemann found examples of some law schools moving 
in that direction. Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Implications, 94 NEB. L. 
REV. 1 (2015). 
172 Discussing the elements of the “clinical method,” Frank S. Bloch noted as long ago 
as 1982 that “no single model… was universally accepted.” The Andragogical Basis of 
Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 326 (1982).  
173 Perhaps beginning with Gary Bellow, On Teaching and Teachers: Some Preliminary 
Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW 
STUDENT 374 (1973). For a contemporary summary of clinical theory and methodology se 
the premier anthology in the field, SUSAN BRYANT, ELLIOT S. MILSTEIN AND ANN C. 
SHALLECK, TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CLINICAL PEDAGOGY (2014) [hereinafter, CLINICAL PEDAGOGY]. 
174 Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Training, Revisited: The Clinical Education Spiral, 19 
CLINICAL L. REV. 489, 497 (2019). 
175 Maybe the only real departure from clinical instruction in our vision of immersion is 
48 Method Lawyering [27-Feb-20 
Katherine Kruse’s characterization of the consensus themes in clinical 
teaching are consistent with teaching by immersion: 
1. Grounding learning in student-lawyers’ work on client problems 
2. Teaching lawyering work as a process 
3. Providing (insisting on?) multiple opportunities to learn from 
critical reflection on their experiences.176 
Perhaps an even more apt description is based on Jeff Giddings’s doctoral 
research into clinical legal education programs, which defines the 
fundamentals of experiential learning method as: 
an intensive small group or solo learning experience in which 
each student takes responsibility for legal and related work for 
the client…in collaboration with a supervisor. Structures enable 
each student to receive feedback on their contributions and to 
take the opportunity to learn from their experiences through 
reflecting on matters including their interactions with the client, 
their colleagues, and their supervisor, as well as the ethical 
dimensions of the issues raised and the impact of the law and 
legal process.177 
Both these accounts nicely encapsulate the approaches deployed in all of the 
different versions of immersion courses using the scenarios in this Article. 
Each posits that we begin from actual experience working with a specific 
problem, then thoughtfully go about working on the problem, and that we 
learn from careful examination of that work.  
Yet our purposes are from those in most clinical courses. For my 
immersion class, and to a significant degree for all of the different courses 
that have so far been based on the Davis/Davenport narratives, a central 
objective is to teach the core legal doctrine covered in the common casebook 
course. In short, then, we draw from clinical methodology to create a richer 
                                                 
an effort to emphasize and explicitly reinforce doctrinal learning as a key objective of the 
enterprise along with more traditional clinical goals of imparting practical skills and 
professional values. “Emphasis” is used here quite intentionally, because I do not actually 
view this as differing from what traditional clinical teaching actually does; merely from what 
it tends most often to be seen as doing. I firmly believe clinical learning has always 
incorporated and reinforced legal doctrine, Carnegie authors’ divisions notwithstanding. But 
though clinical teachers likely agree—see, e.g., id. at 501-503—most discussions of clinical 
pedagogy nonetheless accept the legal academy’s framing of doctrinal learning as primarily 
occurring in casebook-based course work.  
176 Paraphrased from id. at 498. 
177 Jeff Giddings, Why No Clinic is an Island: The Merits and Challenges of Integrating 
Clinical Insights Across the Law Curriculum, 34 WASH. U. J. L & POL’Y 261, 265 (2010). 
Both this portrayal and Kruse’s share a common process of planning for/doing/critically 
reflecting upon the work that real lawyers would undertake in a given scenario, which seems 
to get to the heart of the processes of clinical instruction. See Myths and Misconceptions, 
supra note ___, at 24. 
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version of the more traditional law school classroom. 
 
Teaching Legal Doctrine by Experiential Immersion is an Extension of 
Much Current and Prior Thinking about Legal Education 
Immersive law teaching is in many ways consonant with the proposals 
for reforming legal education that were put forth by the influential Carnegie 
Report in 2007.178 It is, though, probably more ambitiously radical.  
The Carnegie approach classified coursework grounded in Langdellian 
case dialogue as uniquely effective in inculcating one of the “three 
apprenticeships” the Report identified as central to the making of new 
lawyers.179 But the Report was more ambivalent about law schools’ 
effectiveness in professional or ethical training,180 and consequently called 
on legal educators to incorporate additional training in practically-oriented 
coursework to appropriately balance what it deemed the cognitive, ethical 
and practical apprenticeships necessary to developing well-prepared 
attorneys. 181 The Carnegie Report did call for an “integrative” approach to 
the incorporation of the analytical, ethical and practical dimensions of legal 
work rather than an “additive” one, but it did so only briefly.182 And the 
Report’s immense appreciation for the “signature pedagogy” of Socratic case 
dialogue183 used almost exclusively throughout the first year of legal 
education—and frequently thereafter184—may have led readers to mistakenly 
                                                 
178 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note ____. Though we many have moved past that era, 
there was a significant period in which virtually all discussion of legal education referenced 
the Carnegie Report, usually in the context of Roy Stuckey’s near-simultaneously-released 
BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP (2007) [just as a prior 
cohort of reformers nearly universally referenced the equally visionary yet not ultimately 
transformative task force report lead by Robert MacCrate in 1992, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT]. Both the Carnegie Report and Best Practices had 
complementary, though not identical, notions of legal knowledge, skills and values, as well 
as a similar desire to craft models of a more comprehensive legal education which paced 
greater emphasis on experiential professional instructions. Not coincidentally, both of them 
relied heavily on reflections from Peggy Cooper Davis. CARNEGIE REPORT at 39-40, 42, 57, 
200-201; BEST PRACTICES at 99, 147, 207-209, 216-218. 
179 CARNEGIE REPORT, id. at 47-74. See also William M. Sullivan, After Ten Years: The 
Carnegie Report and Contemporary Legal Education, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 331 335 
(2018) (summarizing the report as having found that pervasive case-dialogue teaching in law 
schools failed to provide “training in the full range of capacities needed for legal practice,” 
and neglected the development of “ethical and contextual dispositions essential to 
professional identity”). 
180 Id. at 30-32, 89-91; 127-28 
181 Id. at 194-97. 
182 Id. at 191-92. 
183 Id. at 23-34. 
184 Criticized by Carnegie authors as potentially redundant and producing diminishing 
50 Method Lawyering [27-Feb-20 
conclude that the drafters supported the introduction of more “integrated”185 
coursework primarily in skills classes that would be coequal but adjacent to 
more traditional casebook courses. 
Notwithstanding the Carnegie authors’ possible intentions, a recent study 
of the reach of post-Carnegie curricular innovation in law schools concluded 
that where changes did occur they were most likely to involve lawyering 
skills classes and/or clinical courses offered as electives in the second and 
third years.186 Significantly, most current law professors—and law 
students—would probably agree with Katherine R. Kruse’s assertion that the 
legal academy still actively and passively dichotomizes legal theory from 
legal practice.187 Kruse makes clear that this split is both conceptually untrue 
(she calls it mythical188) and educationally unwise, and she argues that a well-
balanced law curriculum should consist of a progressive sequencing of 
instruction that fully integrates doctrinal and professional skills learning.189 
Kruse is hardly a lone voice articulating this claim; her critique of legal 
education’s cramped cabining of legal doctrine and professional skills is 
widely shared, though perhaps varyingly framed by different critics.190 
In fact, in theorizing about ways to improve learning in 21st century law 
schools, a lot of scholars have suggested teaching in ways that embed legal 
doctrine within practical experiences.191 Using slightly different descriptive 
                                                 
returns. Id. at 75-78. 
185 Professor Davis shares some of the Carnegie Report authors’ appreciation for the 
educational value of Socratic dialogue, but advocates repositioning the goal as 
“desegregating” analytical, ethical and practical teaching rather than “integrating” it. See 
Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1271, 1291 
(2010).  See also Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About 
Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249 (1998) (analyzing and illustrating 
intensive Socratic inquiry in the law classroom).  
186 Stephen Daniels, Martin Katz & William Sullivan, Analyzing Carnegie’s Reach: The 
Contingent Nature of Innovation, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 585, 609 (2014). 
187 Katherine R. Kruse, Legal Education and Professional Skills: Myths and 
Misconceptions about Theory and Practice, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 7 (2013) (hereinafter 
Myths and Misconceptions).  
188 Id. at 9. 
189 This echoes Anthony G. Amsterdam’s groundbreaking conception of staged legal 
education as beginning from basic doctrinal and reasoning skills introduction, then applied 
in finely-crafted simulation courses curated to refine practical skills and reinforce 
conceptual learning, and concluding with closely-supervised apprenticeship experiences in 
the form of live-client clinical work. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 
21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 616 (1984). 
190 Indeed, Gerald P. López contends that the vision embodied in clinical programs 
should “define the fundamental orientation, design and staffing of every law school across 
the country” Transform – Don’t Just Tinker With – Legal Education (Part II), 24 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 247, 250 (2018).  
191 For an early and especially influential example, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The 
Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555 (1980).  
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language or frameworks than ours, numerous law professors began creating 
such courses more than a generation ago.192  
And yet…. Such courses are hardly ordinary. To the contrary, they still 
generally remain unusual enough to warrant their own descriptive law review 
articles.193 [If you are currently connected to a law school, ask yourself: is 
there more than one such course offered? Is there even one at all?] Despite 
persistent calls for substantial change, immersion-style instruction remains 
reserved for specialized courses and usually ones in the upper-level 
curriculum which are chiefly focused on strengthening professional skills. It 
is not seen as a primary means of both teaching legal doctrine and integrating 
(or to use Davis’ formulation, desegregating) ethical and professional 
learning with mastery of legal rules and reasoning.  
So why is it that immersive teaching is not a commonplace—even on its 
way to becoming a signature—legal pedagogy?  
Perhaps this is a byproduct of our unfortunate habit in the legal academy 
of imagining the teaching of legal doctrine as distinct from practical 
training.194 Or our hierarchies and differential categorization of the law 
                                                 
For more current examples see Jennifer E. Spreng, Suppose the Class Began the Day the 
Case Walked in the Door: Accepting Standard 314’s Invitation to Imagine a More Powerful, 
Professionally Authentic First-year Learning Experience, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 421 
(2018); Sheldon Krantz, Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Implications, 94 
NEB. L. REV. 1, 18-29 (2015); R. Michael Cassidy, Reforming the Law School Curriculum 
from the Top Down, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 428, 432-37 (2015).  
Immersive teaching was also envisioned as central to student learning in the hypothetical 
idealized learning-centered law school of the future as envisioned by Rebecca Flanagan in 
Better by Design: Implementing Meaningful Change for the Next Generation of Lawyers, 71 
ME. L. REV. 103, 106 (2018). 
192 Paul Barron, Can Anything Be Done to Make the Upper-Level Law School Courses 
More Interesting? 70 TUL. L. REV. 1881 (1996) (spoiler alert: yes) (describing an immersive 
upper-level course in in bankruptcy law and advocating for more widespread adoption of the 
methodology across a variety of substantive areas of law); Phyllis G. Coleman & Robert M. 
Jarvis, Using Skills Training to Teach First-Year Contracts, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 725 (1996); 
Roberto L. Corrada, Development, A Simulation of Union Organizing in a Labor Law Class, 
46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 445 (1996); Robert G. Vaughn, Use of Simulations in a First-year Civil 
Procedure Class, 45 L. LEGAL EDUC. 480 (1995); Stacy Caplow, Autopsy of a Murder: Using 
Simulation to Teach First Year Criminal Law, 19 N. MEX. L. REV. 138 (1989). 
193 See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Teaching Substantive Environmental Law and Practice 
Skills Through Interest Group Role-Playing, 18 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 194 (2016); David B. 
Oppenheimer, Using a Simulated Case File to Teach Civil Procedure: the Ninety-Percent 
Solution, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 817 (2016). 
194 The Analyzing Carnegie’s Reach study found far more movement toward 
individually-initiated curricular innovation than it did meaningful alteration of faculty 
development or in the traditional faculty incentive structures. Carnegie’s Reach, supra note 
____ at 609-611. The survey’s authors found glimmers of hope for movement toward a more 
coordinated model of lawyer preparation in the future, but concluded that for the most part, 
integrated curricular innovation often continued to be isolated or “piecemeal” See id. at 609. 
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teachers who do primarily Socratic case-method teaching195 from those 
whose teaching emphasizes practical skills and professional ethics.196 Maybe 
it is due to fear or overwork. Concerns about expertise (and lack of).197 The 
linear ease and ready availability of a course design driven by the process of 
casebook selection.198 Concerns about topical coverage and/or substantive 
depth.199 Perhaps despite the many calls for legal education reform and the 
clear desire of the bar,200 there is not yet a firm consensus that learning in law 
school ought to be more integrated. 
But I simply do not believe that last conjecture is true. Though I am quite 
certain there are some holdouts, and of course there must be those who have 
legitimate methodological questions to raise, a familiarity with the legal ed 
literature over recent decades suggests that time for debate about integrated 
learning in law school may have passed.201 I therefore presume that there 
already exists a relatively widespread consensus in support of innovative 
immersive experiential learning in law schools,202 and that nonetheless we 
                                                 
195 Although apart from history and habit there is no reason why attention to these other 
aspects of lawyers’ training cannot have an important place in the doctrinal classroom. See 
Paula Schaefer, A Primer on Professionalism for Doctrinal Professors, 81 TENN. L. REV. 
277 (2014) (calling on all teachers of legal doctrine to explicitly integrate ‘attorney 
professionalism” into their course objectives and outlining means of doing so). 
196 For but one recent reference to the negative effects of stratification within law 
teaching, see Lawprofblog, Legal Writing Professors: A Story of A Hierarchy Within a 
Hierarchy, ABOVE THE LAW, (Sept. 4, 2018, 404 PM), 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/09/legal-writing-professors-a-story-of-a-hierarchy-within-a-
hierarchy/. 
197 See Martin J. Katz, Facilitating Better Law Teaching—Now, 62 EMORY L.J. 823, 833 
(2013) (raising a concern that “not every professor has the type of training that prepares them 
to do good simulations”) (hereinafter Facilitating Better Law Teaching).  
198 See MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, SOPHIE SPARROW & GERALD HESS, TEACHING 
LAW BY DESIGN, 37-54 (esp. 45-47) (2009) (urging law faculty to design courses 
intentionally and with an emphasis on learning goals, and only secondarily selecting 
casebooks to complement those objectives). 
199 Coverage of topical material is a perennial—though perhaps overstated—concern in 
most doctrinally-focused law classes. Id. at 48. Depth of exploration of central legal 
questions also matters tremendously. We believe immersion teaching can actually emphasize 
either or both. Simulation design can be modified to give broad exposure to myriad topics in 
immersion classes, to stimulate intense inquiry into principal themes, or to balance both. 
200 See Mark A. Cohen, Law Schools Must Restructure. It Won’t Be Easy, FORBES, MAY 
15, 2017, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2017/05/15/law-schools-
must-restructure-it-wont-be-easy/#2f86efc03d3f; Bruce Antkowiak, Op-Ed, Law Schools 
Must Reform, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 2011, available at https://www.post-
gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2011/01/04/Law-schools-must-reform/stories/201101040170.  
201 How Experiential Learning in Law Schools Became Widely Accepted, LEGAL REBELS 
PODCAST (Aug. 14, 2019) (interview with law school dean Rodney Smolla, who declares 
“now experiential learning is pretty much accepted by everybody”). 
202 Grounded, as SpearIt and Stephanie Smith Ledesma observe, in a richly-developed 
literature that recognizes the influence of such educational theorists as John Dewey and Paolo 
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are not yet providing as much of it as we do actually agree we should. This is 
likely due to structural inducements,203 some combination of the factors listed 
in the preceding paragraph, and inertia. And in an absence of multiple 
immersive experiential models from most of our own legal educations, it 
undoubtedly also stems from just not knowing where to start or what the 
courses would and should look like.  
I hope this Article provides at least one sample to begin the exciting work 
of imagining this more integrated way to teach and learn law.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The narratives and commentaries included here are not intended to be 
exhaustive. There is certainly more that can be said on most (probably all) 
topics touched on. This piece is meant, though, to showcase some of the kinds 
of thinking that law students do in immersion classes, and the kinds of 
thinking that goes into implementing them. It is meant to show how much is 
accomplished all at once in such learning: consolidation of doctrine, 
analytical skills and tuning innumerable professional skills. 
And to encourage more people to do it. 
And to show that it is fun.  
And possible. 
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